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This thesis addresses the development of United States
military assets for dealing with revolutionary warfare, terrorism,
and other threats which could be identified under the rubric, "low-·
intensity conflict."

Elite military units, collectively identified

as Special Operations Forces (SOF), are examined for the character!sties and attributes which promote misunderstanding and mistrust
about their capabilities.

Some analytical distinctions are developed

which may be useful in defining roles and missions for SOF elements.
Cultural impediments which may inhibit SOF activities are considered
as well.

Research efforts included interviews and discussion

with twenty Special Operations soldiers, both active and retired,
a number of them flag-rank or general officers.

As a result of

his research in this sensitive area, the author concludes that
military SOF are the most adaptable military forces the United
States can field for operation in the current and prospective
low-intensity environment.
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Introduction

Two factors have had a truly significant impact on U.S.
foreign and national security policy since the end of World War
II:

the advent of nuclear weapons and the end of colonialism.

Weapons of mass destruction have fundamentally altered our ways
of thinking about warfare and have prompted extensive research
and considerable

national effort to forestall the terrible

possibilities of their use.

The second factor has not affected

U.S. policy in such a dramatic way, but it does pose vexing
problems that cannot be circumvented through negotiation and
technological innovation.
Deterrence posture is vital to U.S. national security because
societal survival is not merely one of a competing set of options.
It is compelling, therefore, that we prepare strategic nuclear
doctrine and nuclear capabilities for the various possible scenarios.
Below strategic warfare, however, no clean line of demarcation
exists to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, particularly as
tactical instruments during a high-intensity conventional war,
thus the fear of escalation both lessens the likelihood of their
employment and deters conventional conflict.

In that sense, U.S.

and NATO policy is vindicated; that is, deterrence works.

Moreover,

the terrible toll modern conventional warfare may take on combatants,
civilians, property, economies, and. political structures bas
dictated prudence while complementing the nuclear threat in
raising the threshold for conflict to high levels.

When conflict
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does occur, especially at lower levels, it is most likely to be
found in the Third World.
The end of the colonial era has brought about the emergence
of many new actors on the international stage.

Internal dif fi-

culties, historic differences with regional neighbors, and developmental problems have beset many of these predominantly Third
World states and turned them into breeding grounds for conflict.
Since the developing world offers new markets and numerous resources
to the world at large and serves as a source of instability,
it has become a laboratory for competing ideologies and political
systeas as well as the focus of intense interest by more developed
countries.

In a strategic sense, the evolutton of these states

is becoming critical to U.S. national

~ecurity

interests.

Should

we ignore them, their problems may increasingly impinge upon our
interests.
The United States, as a maritime nation, is particularly concerned
with the relationship between emerging states and the protection
of vital sea lanes.

In that regard, conflicts in certain regions

may affect U.S. interests rather markedly.

To avoid association

with colonialist postures and to affirm sensitivities to nationalism
and state sovereignty, the U.S. must exercise considerable skill
in dealing with conflict situations in these areas.

In the

future, traditional U.S. military approaches which are focused on
conventional combat power and high-technol-0gy weapons systems
will be even less viable for Third World conflicts and their
associated problems, particularly since many of these conflicts
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are likely to be unconventional in nature.

New techniques,

doctrine, force structure, and command, control, and coordination
mechanisms should be developed to provide a more effective interplay
between U.S. agencies and assets at home and abroad.
Before we can·consider fresh approaches, however, we must
establish an analytical framework within which conflict and U.S.
politico-military preparations for it can be discussed.

Today,

certain forms of conflict have begun to predominate, such as
revolutionary guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and subversion.
Placed on a spectrum, they might appear as follows:
Normal-Coercive
Revolutionary
Strategic
Diplomacy/Subversion/Terror/Guerrilla War/Conventional War/Warfare

Activities at the lower (i.e., left) end of this spectrum
may overlap or occur as tactical appendages to conflicts of
higher intensity.

As we move from left to right, the numbers of

potential nation-state actors diminish to a few at the strategic
warfare level.

In recent years, only a few states have been

willing to accept the consequences of involvement in high-intensity
conventional warfare (e.g., Iraq v. Iran).

At the left of the

spectrum, scenarios and participants become almost as varied
as the imagination
considerably lower.

~llows,

because the risks of involvement are

Beneath the mid-high intensity conventional

level, conflicts are inherently more political and psychological
than military, though they may have violent military overtones.
The term which has been applied to strife at the lower end
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of the spectrum is "low-intensity conflict" {LIC), a concept
which seems to defy definition, because it may be best described
by what it is not.

Although LIC may have been born of our deterrence

posture, it has little to do with conventional or strategic
warfare, even though it may become strategic in its impact on
U.S. interests.

The built-in ambiguities of LIC baffled the

U.S. in Vietnam and are continuing to challenge the development of
policy to cope with these phenomena, particularly considering
U.S. cultural notions of peace and war and what seems to be a
national affinity for clear-cut choices.
Several recent events have prompted an accelerated U.S.
effort to come to grips with LIC:

the Iran hostage crisis, the

bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, and the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan.

Two salient points are relevant to these examples.

The first is that there are striking differences between the
milieus and actors involved.

While one involved a superpower

intervention and has resulted in a protracted revolutionary war,
another involved the seizure of diplomats and embassy personnel
by revolutionaries and had the eventual sanction of the ascendant
revolutionary government.
Under a broad definition of LIC, a staggering number and
variety of scenarios. are possible; therein, perhaps, lies an
inherent weakness in the term.
perspective, is more important.

A second point, from a policy
A common thread seems to run

through the three examples: all had a shock effect on U.S. policy.
Considering that many events which may be described as LIC are
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low-profile activities, where murky intentions and role-denial is
the norm (e.g., Nicaraguan/Cuban support for El Salvadoran guerrillas), a general U.S. awareness primarily of high-impact events
suggests that conceptual problems may hamper U.S. approaches to
LIC.
Further study of the evolving nature of conflict must be
conducted in an effort to categorize and draw distinctions, such
as between events which have state sponsorship (e.g., 1986 Berlin
disco bombing) and those which are symptomatic of revolution
(Iran hostage crisis).

Distinguishing revolution from other

forms of conflict is critical to the development of sound U.S.
policy.I

Were the purpose of this thesis to provide such dis-

tinctions or to analyze forms of conflict, it would be fruitful
to continue in this vein.

Nonetheless, we must think carefully

about what we may mean by LIC, break it down into digestable
elements, and attempt to develop consistent definitions at the
policy level, as elusive as they may seem.
The ambiguity

o~

LIC

~as

~parked

debate within the Reagan

Administration over proper U.S. responses, notably in the case of
state-sponsored terrorist attacks.
Weinberger and Secretary of State
at odds over this issue.

U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar
G~orge

Shultz have been publicly

Weinberger has expressed fear of collateral

damage, a euphemism, as he calls i t , for "how many women and
children you are going to kill• in responding to terrorist attacks.
I

Dr. Sam C. Sarkesian's work in this area is exceptional.
For example, see Sam c. Sarkesian, ed. Revolutionary Guerrilla
Warfare. Precedent Publishing: Chicago, 1975.
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Moreover, he is concerned that U.S. troops may be committed
to situations without popular support, reflecting, perhaps,
latent Department of Defense post-Vietnam sensitivities.

Shultz,

on the other hand, has adopted an unusual position for a diplomat
by lamenting that the U.S. may become "the Hamlet of nations" by
not striking back against terrorists.2
Each position has some merit, and there may yet be a synthesis to their views.

The American public must understand the

reasons for U.S. involvement in certain types of conflict, particularly those of a protracted and revolutionary nature; otherwise,
a lack of popular support for U.S. objectives will severely limit
U.S. options.

National policy-makers may feel a sense of urgency,

however, about altering perceptions of U.S. credibility in dealing
with attacks on its citizens, affronts to its national prestige,
and assaults on its vital interests.

This debate is only beginning.

By examining the Presidency of John F. Kennedy, we can

develop greater insight into the current milieu.

Kennedy recognized

that Third World conflicts, encouraged by the Soviet Union, would
pose peculiar problems for the U.S ••

Perhaps he was too far

ahead of his time, for he pushed the development of military
assets suited to the tasks of nation-building and unconventional

2

See background bibliography. Although this debate has
received intense press scrutiny, the positions of these advocates
•ay not be so distinct, since the underlying reason for U.S.
inaction is probably a lack of in-depth intelligence.
Another
factor is that some terrorist groups train in heavily populated
areas (Qum, Iran, a religious pilgrimage site is one example).
Moreover, penetration of such groups would be extremely difficult,
as they utilize sophisticated cell structures.
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warfare.

Kennedy, alarmed by Khrushchev's avowed support of

revolutionary wars, saw the U.S. Army Special Forces as the
ideal resource for counteracting Soviet-inspired '"wars of national
liberation:1

With Kennedy's death, DoD emphasis on developing

special warfare capabilities waned;

not surprisingly, 'the emphasis

upon Special Forces in Vietnam shifted correspondingly and took
on a more conventional orientation.

In that regard, Kennedy's

advocacy of special warfare demands serious study, for it holds
poignant lessons for the 1980's •.
As in 1960, the U.S. is poised to resuscitate its special warfare
capacity, now known as Special Operations Forces (SOF).

It seems

that misconceptions and misunderstandings concerning SOF have
continued in abundance; traditional resistance to these forces
has not abated with time.

To complicate matters, the U.S. is

attempting to develop SOF capabilities and doctrine simultaneously,
without the benefit of a strategy or even a clear definition of
the problem (LIC) at hand.
Today's world is more complex than was Kennedy's of 1960;
state-sponsored terrorism, for example, a political weapon bearing
psychological results far out of proportion to the acts committed,
is a relatively new LIC phenomenon presenting serious challenges
to the formulation of U.S. policy.

Perhaps a greater challenge

3 Several works are excellent in this area. Douglas Blaufarb's
The Counterinsurgency Era, The Free Press: New York, 1977, provides
insight into the conceptual and field development of counterinsurgency
thought. Arthur Schlesinger's A Thousand Days, Fawcett Premier: New
York, 1965, and David Halberstam 1 s The Best and the Brightest,
Fawcett Crest: New York, 1972, offer insight into Kennedy's
tenure in office and the attitudes of those surrounding hia.
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to U.S. leaders is the need to enhance public awareness of the
threats to U.S. interests posed by revolution, terror, and subversion.
Our culture seems to understand threats only in a black-white
dichotomy; gray conflicts, or the shadow warfare of LIC, lack the
clarity which we seem to crave (e.g., American identification of
Muammar Khadafy as the epitome of terrorism).
This thesis will address the assumption that has run through
the developaent and redevelopment of SOF -- that these elite
units are our best military assets for LIC.
three chapters:
Individual.

It is comprised of

SOF Development; SOF Characteristics; The SOF

The first chapter discusses the lineage of special

operations, stressing factors which have influenced conventional
military perspectives on SOF.

Kennedy's advocacy of special

warfare is central to this chapter.

The second chapter draws out

operational characteristics which distinguish SOF from conventional
forces, and it explains why SOF is removed from the philosophical
core of the military mainstream.

The third chapter focuses on

the attributes of the SOF soldier and examines why his adaptability
suits the changing requirements of the LIC environment.
An underlying theme in this thesis is that U.S. cultural
impediments may inhibit public and military-wide understanding of
SOF

activ~ties

and the nature of LIC.

In each chapter, some

analytical distinctions are developed which should prove helpful
not only in defining SOF but also in determining roles and missions.
If such distinctions are not made at this early stage of the
redevelopment process, the U.S. will risk misapplication of its
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Special Operations Forces, which seem to be its best military
assets for low-intensity conflict.

Chapter I.

SOF Development

The United States military has a long history of success in
war.

Not surprisingly, lessons learned from those wars have

carried over into philosophy, doctrine, and planning for future
conflicts.

In its major wars of the twentieth century, WWI,

WWII, and Korea, the U.S. had time to exploit its vast industrial
base to develop the capability to overwhelm enemy forces and to
destroy their economic infrastructures.

Although the Korean

conflict was a limited war from the U.S. perspective, it refined
the WWII approach because it involved large troop movements,
heavy applications of firepower, and a taxing drain on American
and enemy resources.

Also common to these conflicts was an

institutional reinforcement of the perception that U.S. military
objectives could be met by the approach employed in each, one
which depended heavily upon mass and concentrated firepower.
The notable exception from this list is Vietnam because the
unconventional nature of that conflict frustrated an American
strategy based on attrition.

The Vietnam conflict is an excellent

prism for observing the relationship between conventional and
special operations forces as well as the nature of low-intensity
conflict.

Certain aspects of the early and pre-Vietnam period

which particularly pertain to SOF will be examined in this chapter.
This chapter will discuss the evolution of SOF by focusing
on their WWII and post-war lineage, developing important distinctions
between special operations units, and examining the cyclical

LIBRARY
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advocacy which SOF seem to receive.

Emphasis will be placed on

the Army Special Forces and the development of Army special
warfare capabilities, although other forces will be discussed
where they are pertinent.

A history of SOF is beyond the scope

of this thesis; but the nascent years of SOF hold the keys to
understanding the halting and often confusing developments in DoD
special warfare capabilities.

By reviewing SOF origins, this chapter

will grapple with what may be the underlying reasons for misunderstanding and antipathy towards SOF from regular military forces.
Long before the U.S. began to develop a powerful industrial
base and, with some reluctance, a larger role in world affairs,
it engaged in several conflicts in which some military forces
relied on stealth, mobility, and surprise to achieve their objectives.
Examples include Major Robert Roger's Rangers of French and
Indian war fame, Francis Marion's partisans during the American
Revolution, and John Mosby's Confederate Rangers during the Civil
Var.

In all three examples, the activities of such groups were

not critical for the achievement of political goals by the primary
combatants, but they·served to redress some of the imbalances in
respective military capabilities.
The weaker antagonists utilized such organizations out of
practical necessity, and in that sense ignored some of the traditional
consensus of opinion on what was ·fair" in war.

For example, the

unconventional approaches of Roger's Rangers during the French
and Indian War were of ten misunderstood and

~ound

contemptible by
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allied British officers. 1

Francis Marion, the "Swamp Fox" of

South Carolina, was one of a number of Americans successfully
utilizing irregular warfare tactics during the American Revolution.
Frustrated by Marion's elusiveness, one British officer exclaimed,
"Marion would not come out and fight like a gentleman and a
Christian.·2

During the American Civil War, Mosby's Rangers played

havoc with Union supply lines, siphoned off large quantities of
equipment for Confederate forces, and continually foiled attempts
by Federal forces to ensnare them.

Despite their difficulties

with Mosby, Union successes in the Civil War encouraged development
of a U.S. military attachment to an attrition style of warfare.
In that conflict, an industrially developed North eventually
overwhelmed a resource-poor South.
In the twentieth century. major land wars have been fought
with the assistance of large industrial capacities and a reliance
upon large troop manuevers and massive firepower.

For the American

Army, industrial capacity and military power have become symbiotic;
we have relied on this relationship to overwhelm the opposition.
Economic might,

then~

is ideally suited to an attrition strategy.

Tremendous resources and technological sophistication have provided
the

u.s.

with great strength for modern warfare, but they have

dulled memories of a revolutionary and sometimes unconventional
1

Robert w. Black (U.S. Army Rangers), •The Beginning of the
American Ranger,· Gung-Ho Magazine, Charlton Publications, Inc.:
Derby, CT, October 1984, P• 21.
2

Frank Barnett,
et.al., eds. Special Operations in US
!trategy. National Defense University Press: Washington, D.C.,
1984, p. 21.
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military past.

Moreover, America depends upon maximizing weapons

systems to minimize human loss in modern warfare, for we place
great value on the lives of our soldiers/citizens.

To quote

General Fred C. Weyand:
War is death and destruction. The American way of
war is particularly violent, deadly and dreadful. We
believe in using "things" -- artillery, bombs, massive 3
firepower -- in order to conserve our soldiers' lives.
America has wielded its industrially-based firepower with great
effectiveness in modern conflicts, decisively ending the global
contest of WWII with conventional combat power and a newly discovered
atomic weapon.

By the same token, American tactics in major

conflicts have deemphasized less destructive or personal means of
combat, the political and psychological nuances of war, and the
complex skills necessary for deterring conflict at its lowest
levels.
In spite of its total nature, WWII spawned the development
of modern U.S. special warfare.

While the U.S. girded its industries

and military for battle, European and Pacific island nations
relied to some extent on partisan organizations in order to cope
with well-prepared and determined occupying powers. 4

The nascent

U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS), a civilian organization
developed for intelligence collection and analysis, was utilized
3 Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context.
Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC: Carlisle Barracks, PA,
1983, p. 25. Chapters II and III further develop this line of
thought.
4 See F.O. Kiksche's Secret Forces. Faber & Faber, Ltd.:
London, 1950. This is an excellent source for understanding
wartime underground movements.
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to coordinate and to implement U.S. approaches to guerrilla
or unconventional warfare operations.5

It is noteworthy that

unconventional warfare and other "unmilitary" activities were
handled by a civilian organization.

To the chagrin of regular

military forces who saw themselves fighting the "real war," the
OSS received glamorous press accolades and personal

attentio~

from President Roosevelt, neither of which discouraged the development
of a rivalry between OSS and military forces.6
Some guerrilla groups were troublesome and uncontrollable,
as they sought to fulfill separatist ambitions or engaged in
nefarious criminal activities. 7

Wartime relationships with such

organizations cast Americans into the seamy side of war, especially
since guerrilla organizations often found the naturally clandestine
infrastructure of criminal organizations to be valuable.a
5

See Alfred H. Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare:
Its
Origins. National Defense University Press: Washington, D.C.,
1982, pp. 34-35.
See also Bradley F. Smith. The Shadow Warriors:
OSS and the Origins of the CIA. Basic Books, Inc.: New York, 1983.
6

Paddock, op. cit., pp. 30-32. Roosevelt lent an open ear
to OSS Chief William Donovan and provided support to the fledgling
organization, setting a precedent which President Kennedy later
followed.
7

Some guerrilla/partisan groups (not limited to WWII) have
seen the dislocation of central governments as an ideal opportunity
to achieve longstanding political aims. Such situations have
sometimes discouraged military leadership from seeking to cultivate
partisan resources. Moreover, in revolutionary situations outside
of major conflicts, where political ambiguities abound, discerning
the intentions of such groups and evaluating the propriety of
their leadership may prove to be difficult (e.g., Sandinistas
and FDN in Nicaragua; FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA in Angola).
8 Lt. General William P. Yarborough, USA (ret.), former
commander, u.s. Army Special Warfare Center. Personal Interview,
Southern Pines, NC, November 9, 1985.
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To command and control guerrilla forces and retain their
allegiance in wartime requires special skills.

A perspective

that such forces are of dubious value to the outcome of the
conflict might preclude any desire to develop those skills.

It

seems that the unconventional operations of the OSS and foreign
counterparts in WWII were not doctrinally central to U.S. war
plans because these activities, in the final analysis, will not
win a major conventional war, whether they are total wars such as
WWII or limited conflicts as in Korea. 9
In addition to OSS operations in WWII, American commando
troops were trained to perform direct action or strike missions
and to assist in or spearhead conventional operations.

Tracing

their origins to Roger's Rangers, the WWII Rangers became the
quintessential combat troops.

In that war they earned tough

reputations, as Darby's commandos "led the way" in the now-famous
Allied assaults on the German positions at Normandy.

Ranger

concepts, which were taught to superior troops in a demanding
environment, were drawn naturally from conventional combat doctrine,
though they put a premium on self-reliance and focused on small unit
tactics.

Colonel Darby sought to maximize the effects of intense

training on his special unit but to minimize symbols of eliteness
by forbidding his Rangers to wear the distinctive beret worn by
9 Lt. General Samuel V. Wilson, USA (ret'd.), former DDO-CIA
and DDIA, Personal Interview I 2, Crewe, VA, October 9, 1985.
See also (as noted in Paddock, op. cit.) Harry Howe Ransome, Central
.!_ntelligence and National Security. Harvard University Press:
Cambridge, 1958, PP• 64-65.
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British and European commandos. 10

Darby chose, then, to emphasize

the G.I. nature of his troops rather than what was different
about them.
Despite their secondary roles in WWII, both unconventional
and commando forces augmented conventional operations by attacking
strategic targets, reconnoitring enemy-held areas for tactical
and strategic intelligence, and operating or organizing movements
in rear areas.

During America's major wars, an affinity for

firepower and an attrition-based strategy seem to have precluded
a comprehensive understanding of the value of unconventional and
commando capabilities for use in war.

For the ·violent peace·

which we call low-intensity conflict, wartime legacies have left
the U.S. organizationally, doctrinally, and philosophically
ill-equipped to conduct the types of warfare LIC demands.

Moreover,

the contrast between the commando operations of Rangers and the
guerrilla organizational activities of the OSS has been lost on
many observers because the post-WWII era thoroughly intertwined
the concepts.

Later organizational and doctrinal confusion

became almost inevitable byproducts.
Following WWII, some U.S. military leaders recognized a need
for

wel~trained

military elements to conduct unconventional

IO James J. Altieri, "Darby's Rangers,· Gung-Ho Magazine,
op. cit., P• 59. The significance of the beret in the assimilation
of special operations units will be examined later in this chapter.
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warfare behind the lines of a conventional war in Europe. 11
Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, supported by Lt. Colonel
Russel1 Volckmann, Colonel Aaron Bank, and others, championed the
development of these forces during the Korean conflict, at least
partly out of frustration with the lack of CIA-Army coordination
in clandestine activities.

Born in 1952 as an outgrowth of

the Psychological Warfare Center, the Army Special Forces (SF) traced
their origins to WWII operations by the OSS, but, as Colonel
Paddock has noted in his book, U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its
Origins, SF adopted the First Special Service Force (organized
for arctic and other special operations) and the Rangers into its
officia1 lineage. 12
blunt fashion:
the Army.-13

Brigadier General Don Blackburn put it in

"Special Forces have always been the bastards of
Though SF officially evolved from the Rangers, the

concepts underlying their respective operations are fundamentally
different.
Upon the creation of SF, many OSS veterans drifted into
military service; others went to work for the progeny of their
parent organization, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

From

11 SF was probably conceived as a strategic element of a
"roll-back" strategy. But after the failure of _many CIA covert
operations in Eastern Europe, the utility of SF in its partisan
organization role may have become suspect.
12

Paddock, op. cit., P• 23.

13 Brigadier General Donald D. Blackburn, USA (ret'd.), former
SACSA to JCS at the time of the Son Tay Raid in 1970. Personal
interview, McLean~ VA: November 13, 1985. General Blackburn was
not ref erring specifically to SF origins but was speaking about
general perceptions of SF.
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that standpoint, some traditional soldiers looked upon the association
between Special Forces, OSS, and the CIA with suspicion, wondering
whether the practices of these uncpnventional groups and their
unusual cast of operators had anything in common with warfare
as our military professionals had come to know it.

Moreover, the

subsumption of SF under the Psychological Warf are center clouded
distinctions between the roles and missions of SF and Psychological
Operations units.14
Although unconventional warfare, as practiced by SF, may
involve the direct action and strategic reconnaissance missions
normally associated with commando operations, most SF activities
are

~rganizational

and educational in nature.

They may even

include civic action projects such as medical care, construction,
and teaching.

Because SF operate in an alien and sometimes hostile

environment for extended periods, it is essential that they
understand the milieu and, naturally, the host language of the
area in which they might work.

Rangers, on the other hand,

conduct primarily direct action or strike missions (as well
as tactical or strategic reconnaissance).

The short duration of

their missions requires minimal regional understanding and area
orientation.
These distinctions would seem self-evident, but they have
not always been understood and applied by the conventional establishment which commands them, perhaps because commando or strike
14

Barnett, op. cit., PP• 240-244. Paddock, op. cit.,
extensively discusses the organizational marriage of Special
Forces to Psychological Warfare.

19
operations devolve· from conventional perspectives and military
traditions whereas SF operations (with their OSS roots) do not.
Within SOF units, there is sensitivity toward these distinctions.
The recent creation, then, of counter-terror strike forces (i.e.,
units operating within the Joint Special Operations Command) is
more in keeping with U.S. military tradition than are forces
oriented toward revolutionary environments (as represented by
.
SF).15
Even counter-terror developments have been confusing,
though, since the underlying concept behind the creation of Delta
Force, the Army's counterterrorist unit, pointed to the development
of a multi-purpose special warfare force similar to the British
Special Air Service (SAS). 16

An American tendency toward special-

ization and its impact on SOF will be discussed in the conclusion
of this paper. To shed more light on military special warfare
development, other military units should be examined, particularly
since many LIC contingencies would require joint SOF missions
and an inter-service cooperation which, historically, has not
been well-coordinated.
The Navy's SEALs (an acronym foi Sea, Air, and Land) were
developed from WWII-era Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT s), but
15

Sam c. Sarkesian, ·American Posture for Low Intensity
Conflicts: Misconceptions, Misdirections, and Organizational
Ambiguity,• pp. 35-36. Delivered at the Airpower Symposium, Air
University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Karch 1985.
16 There are, however, unique requirements for counter-terror
operations. Colonel Charlie Beckwith provides insight into the
background and development of Delta Force for counter~terror (CT)
missions in his book, co-written with Donald Knox, Delta Force.
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich: San Diego, CA, 1983.

20

they were cultivated during the Kennedy push for special warfare.
Therefore, they trained for riverine and coastal operations which
could effectively deny guerrillas their havens and supplies.
SEALs developed a fearsome reputation in their multi-purpose
roles during Vietnam.

Unlike Army SF, who sometimes advised

South Vietnamese forces, few SEAL operations in Vietnam were of
an advisory nature; their roles, in that regard, bore some resemblance
to those of the British SAS in Malaysia during the 1950's.17
Since then, however, SEALs have refocused on "blue-water" operations
such as reconnaissance, obstacle clearance, and sabotage as
opposed to "brownwater" activities such as counter-revolution.
As one SEAL officer has said:
The SEALs have had to focus on providing operational
support of the Navy's fleets, especially since the end
of Viety3m combat; it's an organizational survival issue
for us.
In contrast to the Navy, Air Force special warfare developed
with a guerrilla orientation, due to the many resupply missions
which the "Air Commandos" flew for OSS operators and foreign
17

A non-attributable conversation with an active-duty
enlisted SEAL was helpful. He argued that though SEALs are
currently training foreign naval commandos (El Salvador) and may
play roles in protracted conflicts, their primary orientation is
toward strike missions (including, of course, reconnaissance) in
support of Navy (and Marine) objectives. Therefore, SEAL operations
would seem to have more in common with the Army Rangers than with
the Special Forces. As with the Army, the development of a counterterror SEAL team flows naturally from their origins as direct
action elements.
18 Quoted (non-attributed) in Colonel August G. Jannarone,
USAF, "Towards a National Operational Philosophy for the Employment
of Joint Special Operations Forces.· Written under the auspices
of the Senior Seminar, U.S. Department of State. Rough draft,
June 1986, P• II.
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nationals in support of WWII regional objectives.

In Vietnam,

their missions were varied though often in a ground support role,
hence the development of gunships such as the AC-47 and the
Spectre.

Because of the Air Force's strategic warfare considerations,

however, SOF missions have been considered a minor concern within
the Air Force, and equipment essential for low-profile or clandestine
penetration missions has not always been in a high state of readiness,
strangely enough, even following the collapse of the Iran rescue
attempt.19

Low-technology transfer, training techniques, counter-

insurgency, and civic action -- all potentially important Air
Force roles in LIC -- have received even less attention than have
airlift capabilities.
Within the Army, aviation needs have long been oriented
toward ground missions.

For that reason, Army SOF aviation has

been developed to fill gaps left open by Air Force SOF, especially
for short-range, rotary-wing (helicoptor) missions.

Shortfalls

apparent in the Iran mission as well as a debilitated CIA paramilitary
capability prompted the inception of Task Force 160th, a secretive
aviation battalion based at Fort Campbell, KY.

While the Air

Force has retained certain missions and ordered new aircraft,
Army aviation has indicated a willingness to accept new and more
19

Debates over Air Force SOF missions are at the forefront
of the modern build-up. For a better understanding of this
problem, see September-January 1985-86 issues of Armed Forces
Journal International. For long-range penetration missions,
state-of-the-art equipment is an imperative, so doctrine must be
carefully developed to avoid the compromise/failure of missions.
See also The Role of AirPower in Low-Intensity Conflict, 4 v.,
Airpower Symposium, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama: March
1985.
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diverse responsibilities if they are given resources adequate for
their development. 20

The issue of SOF aviation has even captured

the attention of Congress, but it has not yet been resolved.
In many ways, these Army, Navy, and Air Force SOF units are
similar in their orientation toward combat, though the substantial
role differences between protracted (SF) and strike (Rangers or
Delta Force) elements must be considered.

There are, however,

other more distinguishable units which are currently considered
to be SOF.

They are Army Psychological Operations (PSYOPs) and

Civil Affairs units.

Both trace their roots to WWII, where they

had considerable wartime missions.

That legacy has relegated

much of their manpower base to reserve units.

In their SOF

relationship, both are well-suited to protracted conflicts,
though they may support (PSYOPs primarily) strike operations.
PSYOPs units have a dual lineage, drawing both on a formal
development under the Army's aegis and on the influence of OSS
operations during WWII.

As noted earlier, SF emerged as PSYOPs'

•poor cousin• at the Psychological

W~rfare

Center at Fort Bragg,

NC; their organizational wedding complicated the development of
either as a distinct entity.

This situation has presented problems

for the utility of PSYOPs as national strategic assets and in the
early years probably inhibited the development of the Special
20

There is legitimate concern that Army aviation could not
fill critical preparedness gaps during an interim phase-out of
rotary-wing (helicoptor) Air Force SOF. The solution will probably
come from an enhanced Army role for short-range missions, with
long-range penetrations of hostile airspace left for the time-being
with the Air Force.
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Forces concept.21

Their relative positions changed in'the 1960's,

as PSYOPs became the weaker partner to SF, an alignment which has
continued to the present. 22
With a close special warfare relationship, PSYOPs will
undoubtely encounter coordination problems which will hamper U.S.
efforts to develop themes designed to promote regional and international psychological objectives. To compound PSYOPs problems,
Americans seem to feel that something is inherently •dirty• about
psychological activities, particularly those associated with
warfare.

Likewise, unconventional warfare and other SOF-related

terms seem to be distasteful to many Americans.

So SOF semantic

difficulties go beyond definitions in that the related terminology
may strike a cultural nerve.
The original subsumption of special operations units under
the PSYOP umbrella (and the modern reversal) may stem from General
William Donovan's conception of the value of unconventional
warfare..!!.!. a psychological weapon •. His comprehensive views
contributed heavily to the

developme~t

of CIA paramilitary capa-

bilities -- which, interestingly, are also called special operations
-- and to a psychological or propaganda apparatus within the
CIA. 2 3

To the chagrin of military proponents such as General

21 Barnett, op. cit. (article by Colonel Paddock), PP• 237-245,
247-249.
22 Colonel Alfred H. Paddock, USA, U.S. Department of
State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, former Commander, 4th
PSYOP Group. Personal Interview, Washington, D.C.: November 29,
1985. See also Paddock, op. cit., P• 146.
23

Ibid., P• 35.
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McClure, the CIA sought to develop the Special Forces idea itself;
that situation should tell the perceptive student that PSYOPs and
SF activities were not necessarily considered to be endemic to
the military profession, at least not by non-military members of
the national security establishment.

24

Besides PSYOPs, Civil Affairs units are the other unusual
elements referred to as SOF.

Like PSYOPs, they would play critical

wartime roles in support of overall objectives, because they have
unique capabilities for reorganizing war-torn areas.

They demon-

strated their value to expeditionary types of missions in the
recent Grenada operation, and they have performed cooperative
roles with the Agency for International Development (AID), the
CIA, and other government agencies during Vietnam and less publicized
conflicts.25

They offer special resources for either protracted

(revolutionary guerrilla war) or short-term (expeditionary) LIC
environments, though they are less applicable to strike operations.
Civil Affairs and PSYOPs units are geared for high-intensity
warfare, yet they have retained such close association with
special warfare that they are considered to be SOF.

Since both

are oriented toward political, social, and psychological ends
the characteristics most central to LIC

PSYOPs and Civil

Affairs should be at forefront of a SOF renewal.

Yet, Reagan

Administration interest in SOF has been so focused on counter24

25

Ibid., also pp. 130-133.

See Barnett, op. cit., (chapter by Douglas Blaufarb),
pp. 207-220.
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terrorism and strike operations that leadership perspectives on
SOF are likely to become one-dimensional, that is, skewed toward
a commando concept, if only from a lack of awareness of other
possible SOF roles and missions.

These non-combat units have

probably not received attention commensurate to their potential
LIC roles, and until that situation is addressed and reversed,
particularly in an organizational sense, critically valuable
SOF assets may be underdeveloped.
The reader should realize by now that there are some important
distinctions which must be made in order to maximize U.S. SOF
assets.

Organizational confusion has certainly contributed to

the circuitous development of special operations capabilities,
but it is not the only reason for slow SOF growth and a lack of
acceptance by conventional forces.

Because few flag-rank officers

have been exposed to SOF and most with SOF experience have been
unable to retain associations with SOF units, a lack of effective
special operations advocacy within.u.s. military leadership has
led to a "benign neglect" of SOF.

26

SOF has long been perceived within ~he military as a "career
ki1ler;"27

as one author described the status of SF in the

1960's, "Special Forces were known to be a dead end for anyone
26

Letter from Lt. General Carl H. Cathey, USAF, Vice-Commander
of USAFE, December 15, 1985.
27

"Military Special Operations,·
transcript, November 22, 1985, P• 2.

ABC News Nightline
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who aspired to a high rank.· 28

Despite a lack of professional

incentive, many SOF soldiers have chosen to risk slow career
development to remain with their units.

Chapter III will discuss

the individual traits which propel this tendency.

For all the

former difficulties, these forces have survived to the present to
become the subject of intense interest by policy-makers, as in
the early years of the 1960's.

That period holds insight into

the bureaucratic challenges of advocating and developing SOF.
In 1960, President John F. Kennedy took office and began a
personal campaign to build a U.S. capacity for counteracting
·wars of national liberation" or
and guerrilla wars.

Soviet-suppo~ted

insurgencies

In a speech to graduating West Point cadets

in 1962, Kennedy said:
This is another type of war, new in its intensity,
ancient in its origin -- war by guerrillas, subversives,
insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat;
by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory
by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging
them •••• It requires a whole new kind of strat~gy, •wholly
different kind of military training.29
Kennedy found military leadership reluctant to respond to
his efforts to develop a doctrine for •counterinsurgency," for
few military leaders shared his perception that a new and different
kind of warfare had come into being.

Even his Special Military

Representative for counterinsurgency, Genera1 Maxwell Taylor,

... looked

on the counterinsurgency business as a faddish distraction

28

Loren Baritz, Backfire. William Morrow and Company,
Inc.: New York, 1985, p. 242.
29

Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation.
Inc.: Garden City, NY, 1967, P• 412.

Doubleday & Company,
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from the main responsibility of training for conventional assault.-

30

Most military leaders viewed new capabilities as superfluous to
those already in existence; General George H. Decker, Army Chief
of Staff 1960-62, said, ·Any good soldier can handle guerrillas.·31
General Taylor made similar comments which reflected the military's
confidence in its institutional preparation for conventional
warfare and its occasional guerrilla facet.

To their credit,

those viewpoints are credible in the context of a total war, in
which population security and political repercussions are not
primary concerns.

It seems, then, that President Kennedy and

military leaders were not operating from the same conceptual base.
Kennedy took a personal interest in the U.S. Army Special Forces
(SF), the elite element of the U.S. military which was at that time
oriented toward partisan organization in wartime Europe.

He believed

that these guerrilla warfare experts could shift to a counterguerrilla role and thus offer a riposte to Khrushchev's challenge.
The weak military underpinnings of .modern U.S. unconventional
warfare experiences have already been pointed out; yet, General
Decker stated confidently in reference to SF preparation for
counter-guerrilla warfare that ·similar units were used considerably
during WWII •••• This is not something new.
30

It's something in

Schlesinger, op. cit., P• 318.

31 Drawn from Captain (now Major) Andrew Krepenevich's
unpublished thesis, •The United States Army and Vietnam: Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Army Concept of War,• West Point, NY,
1982, p. 25.
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which the Army has quite a bit of experience.· 32

Actually,

the U.S. Army had little modern experience at that time in counterguerrilla warfare and virtually none in coping with the highlyorganized cadres of communist revolutionary movements.
The prevailing logic which drove Kennedy's promotion of SF
was that "it takes a bandit to catch a bandit,•33

despite assurances

from the conventional military that counterinsurgency was really
a "hammer and anvil" concept best conducted by conventional
forces as in the Indian wars of the American west. 34

Again,

General Taylor:
It (counterinsurgency) is just a form of small
war, a guerrilla operation in which we have a long
record against the Indians. Any well-trained organization can shift the tempo to that which might be
required in this kind of situation. All this cloud of
dust that's coming out of the White House really isn't
necessary. 35
In developing a Third World counter-guerrilla orientation,
SF adopted a posture far apart from its original intent, and one
which traditionalists considered to be unnecessary for the task
of counterinsurgency.

But Kennedy viewed the LIC problem as

spanning arenas outside of the normal military purview, and he
therefore "insisted that the Special Forces be schooled in sanitation,
32

From files of the Center for Military History, Washington,
D.c., Interview with General George H. Decker, U.S. News and
World Report, Kay 29, 1962, PP• 67-68.
33

Interview, Blackburn, op. cit ••

See Chapter II section

(5) for an explanation of the relevance of SOF-criminal associations.

34

Donald Duncan. The New Legions. Random House:
1967, pp. 201-202.
35

Krepenevich, op. cit., P• 25.

New York,

29
teaching, bridge-building, medical care and the need for economic
progress,· all of which deviated considerably from the original
SF mission.

36

Kennedy's conception of SF as a sort of •peace Corps with
guns• never caught on within the military mainstream, though SF
were often utilized in that fashion during the early years (1960-64)
of Vietnam, largely under CIA auspices.

After the deaths of

Kennedy and President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam, "Operation
Switchback" reverted SF operations to military control.

With the

introduction of American combat units, SF roles were shifted to
support conventional operations.

37

Other special warfare units

which had blossomed during Kennedy's counterinsurgency campaign
also withered in the face of an increasingly conventional approach
to the conduct of the Vietnam war.
It seems that "topside" political fixes to SOF have been
impermanent because of a lack of intra-military advocacy; even
such a powerful SOF political benefactor as Kennedy could not
foist revolutionary ideas on a DoD devoted to clearly-defined
threats.

Perhaps the advocacy problem does lie outside of the

military, since the fundamental orientation of the American
military is toward conventional and strategic warfare.

In that

sense, it is unfair to expect men whose full-time job is to
prepare for conventional or strategic warfare to understand and
36 Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 318. See also preface by Lt.
General William P. Yarborough in Charles Simpson, Inside the
Green Berets. Presidio Press: Novato, CA, 1982.
37

Interview I 2, Wilson, op. cit ••
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prepare for the intracacies of Lic.38

Viewed through conventional

lenses, today's low-intensity conflicts may seem no different to
U.S. military leaders than they did to General Earle Wheeler,
former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who declared authoritatively in 1962:
It is fashionable in some quarters to say that the
problems in Southeast Asia are primarily political and
economic rather than military. I do not agre~g The essence of the problem in Vietnam is military.
In sum, SOF development. has been a tortuous process in which
there has been little conceptual consistency.

Moreover, most

conventional leaders have viewed special operations as an adjunct
to the conventional mission. These leaders did not consider SOF
to be useful tools for counteracting new threats, probably because
they were either unaware of low-intensity threats or did not
believe that LIC was different enough from conventional warfare
to warrant development of specialized forces.

In addition to

these issues, SOF characteristics seem so foreign to "regulars·
that they promote resentment toward SOF by the mainstream.
What operating characteristics distinguish SOF from conventional
forces?

Are these forces so divergent from conventional norms

that they do not belong in the military?

Why have some observers

suggested attaching SOF to the CIA, creating a sixth military
service, forming a Unified Command, or placing SOF under the
38

Interview, Yarborough, op. cit ••

39

Hilsman, op. cit., P• 426.
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aegis of a separate DoD body, such as a Defense Special Operations
Agency?

It seems likely that the latter may occur soon; the

advantages and limitations to each approach are now under debate
in Congress. 40

The second chapter, then, will review those factors

which allow differentiation between SOF and conventional forces,
and it will discuss the operational characteristics which make
SOF applicable to LIC.
40

See Dan Daniel, •A Sixth Service for Special Operations?"
Armed Forces Journal International, Washington, D.C., August
1985, Sen. William S. Cohen, R-ME, •A Defense Special Operations
Agency: Fix for an SOF Capability that is Most Assuredly Broken,·
Armed Forces Journal International, January 1986, and Noel Koch
and J. Michael Kelly, "Two Cases Against a Sixth Service ••• for
Special Ops,· Armed Forces Journal International, October 1985.

Chapter II.

SOF Characteristics

Why may it prove necessary to create a separate agency as
a home for U.S. military SOF assets?

Why did President Kennedy

find advocacy of SF such a challenge and military leadership
reluctant to comply with his wishes?

Why did Colonel Beckwith's

efforts with Delta Force in the 1970's meet resistance and disdain?
In reviewing SOF origins, we can find some of the answers.

By

examining these eleven salient characteristics of SOF operations,
all of which contrast sharply with conventional operations, the
reasons may become even more apparent.

(1)

SOF rely on speed, stealth, and surprise to achieve objectives.
Operating in small units, they utilize low profiles to avoid
being targeted by superior firepower.
Surprise, given an
imbalanced troop ratio, is essential to SOF success.

(2)

Secrecy is of the essence for SOF. Without it, their greatest
strengths are compromised.
In other w~rds, informed adversaries
can be deadly to SOF.

(3)

SOF operate symbiotically with intelligence assets for the
above reasons, and they may fall under CIA operational
control periodically, especially for clandestine missions.

(4)

SOF operate primarily at night to accentuate their strengths.

(5)

SOF depend upon individuals. NCO's and enlisted men, not
colonels and generals, may make critical field-decisions.
They are, conceptually, not unlike CIA operatives in that
they implement U.S. policy in the field.

(6)

SOF operate on the periphery of military norms, and they are
often involved in unusual and secret activities. Therefore,
they tend to develop something of a romantic "outlaw" image.
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(7)

Some SOF are attuned to a particular political-cultural milieu
and may need specialized area-training and linguistic abilities
because their activities may focus on political, social, and
psychological goals rather than solely on military objectives.

(8)

Many SOF activities have unusual requirements, often making
special equipment and logistics necessary. The operators
are likely to attempt something which bas not been attempted
before. In that sense, every special operation is unique.

(9)

Peacetime SOF missions (the LIC environment) can take on a
politically supercharged nature, especially hostage-rescue
and other direct action missions. A conventional establishment rooted in the American polity would rather not
take the discredit for failed operations (e.g., the Iran
mission).

(10) Due to their saall size, intense training, and the operations
they conduct, SOF are military elites. They may drain off
the best and most "warrior-oriented" men from line units.
(11) Most important, perhaps, is that SOF activities are a form
of military martial art which might be more closely associated
with the writings of Sun Tzu than those of Clausewitz.
It will be useful at this point to examine each of these characteristics in greater detail.

(1)

SOF ground elements such as SF, Rangers, and SEALs emphasize

small unit tactics and attempt to accomplish their objectives
through clandestine infiltration/exfiltration and surprise.
Because SOF are not generally mechanized units (perhaps with the
exception of Delta Force, whose logisitics may necessitate a
semi-mechanized status), these soldiers are highly mobile.

They

usually work in small teams, often comprised of 16 or fewer
men.

All of these units emphasize self-reliance and coping with

34

unusual eventualities.

In that regard, standard operating procedures

(SOP) can inhibit the flexibility required for special operations
and detract from preparations for specialized SOF tasks; many
solutions to special operations problems could not appear in a
manual designed for general digestion. 1

In the case of advisory

support for a nation involved in counter-revolutionary or counterinsurgency activities (note: these are not synonyms because
insurgents may not seek to disestablish the social and political
order), SF might keep a low profile, perhaps by operating in
civilian garb, but they would not necessarily depend upon stealth,
except for organizing ambushes. 2

For Ranger. counter-terror,

and wartime SF aissions, surprise is an obvious requirement, one
which"is supported by clandestinity.

(2)

3

Because so many of their operations are secret, SOF tend to

be clannish, like employees of the CIA.

Clandestinity promotes

suspicion within the mainstream, a situation exacerbated when
cooperation between conventional and unconventional forces is
1

Dr. Alan F. Farrell, Professor of French, Hampden-Sydney
College, USAR, SF. Personal Interview, Hampden-Sydney, VA,
December 1986.
Self~reliance as a SOF trait or individual
attribute will be discussed in Chapter III.
2

With the recent assassination of SEAL Schaufelberger in
El Salvador, obvious American presences may be drawn down to the
point that stealth practically becomes an advisory characteristic.
3 Extraordinary secrecy surrounds SOF units (see I 2). In
hostage situations, a decision to use force could imperil hostages
if the captors were aware of an impending assault. For examples
of operational security considerations, see the Holloway Report
on the Iranian rescue mission or various accounts of the German
rescue at Mogadishu.
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necessary.

Vietnam is replete with examples of conventional

officers arriving in their operational areas to find SF soldiers
who could not brief them because of operational security requirements.
From a policy standpoint, ~ecrecy may be necessary or desirable
to permit a U.S. role-denial, especially when a host nation
or revolutionary movement would rather not acknowledge outside
assistance.

While secrecy may help to promote low profiles, it

may also stimulate a converse effect of enhanced public and press
curiosity. 4

Although largely left unsaid, there are also deep-seated

fears in this country of secret, highly-trained, politically-astute
military elites; the book Seven Days in May, a 1950's novel,
considered the possibility of an American coup d' etat by such
forces.5

Congressional oversight and press leaks have seriously

limited the viability of "covert" CIA operations and may eventually
affect SOF in a similar fashion.

It seems that a cultural aversion

toward secrecy may have an impact on the utility of SOF in clandestine
missions.

(3)

In conventional combat operations, mistakes can be redressed

by throwing in more troops, utilizing increased firepower, or changing
tactics/maneuvers.

In other words, these operations usually can

be attempted again with a different approach.

In the special

4

Proponents of SOF have sought some of the publicity
of the current build-up to enhance public awareness of the need
for these forces and because of retrenched organizational resistance
to SOF development.
5

Interview # 1, General Wilson, op. cit ••
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operations arena, particularly for direct action missions, there
is rarely a chance to regroup for a second attempt.

6

SOF,

therefore, must have a timely and accurate intelligence flow.
Without it, the chances for special operations successes are
minimal.

In the case of the Iran mission, DoD was forced to

place its own agents in Tehran; the CIA strip-down during the
1970's contributed to that dilemma and raised questions about
intelligence support for special operations.
For SF operations, information about the political climate
may be critical.

For SOF aviation, military and civilian intelligence

resources must study hostile radars to discern the best in/exfiltration routes and landing sites; they may also evaluate targets
~

and help to determine mission requirements through both human and
technical means. 7

Intelligence support for PSYOP and Civil

Affairs efforts can be critical as well.

PSYOP units must understand

population targets, ethnic characteristics, and regional peculiarities.

In Civil Affairs operations, restructuring of shattered

areas and dislocated populations would not be effective without
a thorough understanding of the people and milieus involved:
where "hearts and minds" rather than military forces are the
6

7

Ibid.

The Soviets would delight at revealing U.S. clandestine
operations to their surrogates or to any state hostile to the
U.S., hence, the need for recognition of Soviet ELINT and EW ·
capabilities, as well as those within target states. For SOF
aviation, then, coordination with NSA and all other intelligence
resources is essential. The U.S. raid in 1970 on the Son Tay
prison camp in North Vietnam is an excellent case study of this
challenge.
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center of gravity, civic action operations should not have to
rebuild the chaos created by heavy firepower.8
Quality intelligence of a tactical and strategic nature is
necessary for the effective use of SOF assets.

Like SOF, American

intelligence resources must coordinate with host intelligence
services and help to improve their effectiveness in supporting
indigenous forces and American SOF. 9

Ironically, the abortive

CIA Bay of Pigs operation, which raised questions about the CIA's
ability to command large paramilitary operations, was a catalyst
in the I960's development of SOF.

Despite National Security

Action Memorandum's 54-57, which sought to clarify the respective
domains of CIA and SOF, SOF and intelligence activities may
coincide or overlap at points, requiring a "baton pass" for a
transition from an intelligence to a military operation.

For a

successful "pass," an earlier relationship must exist. IO
SOF personnel (usually SF) have been placed under CIA operational
control from time to time, a situation which makes conventional forces
nervous and dual command and control relationships uncertain.II
8

Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam. Oxford University
Press:
New York, I978~ p. I56. Lewy discusses the heavy American
reliance on firepower and its fundamental asymmetry to counterinsurgency and small-unit operations conducted in civilian environments.
9

The Phoenix effort at destroying the Vietcong infrastructre
(VCI) in Vietnam is a noteworthy study. See Stuart Herrington's
Silence Was a Weapon. Presidio Press: Novato, CA, I982.
IO

Inte~view

I 2, Wilson, op. cit ••

II A recent Washington Post article, entitled "Army's
Covert Role Scrutinized" reflects the CIA-SOF association fears,
November 29, I985, p. AI,s,9. See also, Eliot Cohen, Commandos
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For example, during the Vietnam conflict, the U.S. Army attempted
to prosecute the commander of the Fifth Special Forces Group,
Colonel Bob Rheault, and some of his men .for the alleged murder
of a suspected Viet Cong informant.

Since Rheault and his men

were under CIA auspices at the time and the Agency was reluctant
to cooperate, the case was dropped, but not without some repercussions. 12

Given Congressional dispositions and national

attitudes of the 1970's toward CIA, press revelations of such
relationships foster an unwarranted fear of "spooks" which can
damage U.S. objectives. 13

It may be that our cyclical affinity

for CIA and SOF may be reachin.g a pinnacle, and for that reason,
promote less mistrust of either.14
and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies.
Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 1978.
12 See John s. Berry. Those Gallant Men:: On Trial in
Vietnam. Presidio Press: Novato, CA, 1984. As Berry notes,
many in SF felt that General Creighton Abrams was venting his
personal enmity for SF and attempting to discredit them through
the case. The case could also be considered an example of why conventional forces are inapplicable to unconventional conflicts,
because certain activities in LIC which may be practical to its
successful prosecution may defy democratic norms.
13

Personal Interview with Ted Lunger, House Armed Services
Committee, Staff of Rep. Dan Daniel, D-VA, former U.S. Army Special
Forces. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 1985.
14

Frank Klingberg has pointed out the cyclical nature of U.S.
approaches to foreign policy by identifying introvertish and
extrovertish phases. On a related note, Harry Howe Ransome has
discussed CIA in terms of cultural reactions to perceptions that
U.S. interests are being impinged upon abroad. In that sense, he
asserts that Americans assent periodically to "letting the Agency
loose" like a watchdog, a thought which could also be applied to
SOF. See Harry Howe Ransome, "Strategic Intelligence and Intermestic
Politics," Charles w. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf.
Perspectives on American Foreign Policy. St. Martin's Press: New
York, 1983, PP• 299-319.
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(4)

Most SOF units conduct nighttime operations to utilize their

main strengths -- stealth and surprise.
operate at night, but only rarely.

Conventional units may

It is interesting to note

that night operations, like amphibious and arctic operations,
were referred to as special operations in 1951; the term ·special
operations· was then supplanted by ·special forces operations·
which in turn became "unconventional warfare.·15

Despite confusion

over definitions, there is general agreement among students of
this subject that SOF activities are usually conducted at night.
In revolutionary guerrilla wars or insurgencies, the night
is usually the province of the guerrilla; to meet him on his
ground, SOF must train in that environment and learn to think
like the guerrilla (the rationale for developing SF for the
counter-guerrilla mission).

Only highly motivated units will

operate at night, so in order for SF to train indigenous forces,
locals must have a stake in the success of operations and in the
solvency of their government -- South Vietnamese Provincial
Reconnaissance Units (PRUs), comprised of local elements, were
such forces.16

Likewise, strike units such as SEALs, Rangers,

and Delta Force usually operate at night to enhance their effective15

Paddock, op. cit., p. 139. The 1983 conference which
led to the publication of Special Operations in U.S. Strategy was
an assembly of the foremost thinkers in this area, yet no conceptual
and definitional synthesis came out of it. The papers published
in that work reveal varying ideas about the nature of Special
Operations.
16

Interview

H 1, Wilson, op. cit ••
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ness. 17

SOF aviation, with their low-level flights and tricky

maneuvering, can be especially hazardous at night; 18

Army SOF

aviation (known as the "Hightstalkers-) goes by the motto, ·neath
Waits in the Dark.·

An unforeseen enemy can strike fear into the

hearts of adversaries.

SOF capitalize on human fears about the

unknown, as do terrorists and guerrillas.

(5)

Another element of American society besides military SOF prefers

operating at night --criminals.

Chapter I

briefly discussed the

symbiosis between a clandestine criminal infrastructure and SOF
attempting to penetrate a closed or hostile society.

SOF association

with black marketeers and other criminals may be useful though
undesirable linkages for operations in a totalitarian environment.19
On the other side of the LIC coin, Reagan Administration officials
have argued that the Soviets and their surrogates make use of
organized crime in the form of drug-dealing to support and conceal
their operations.

Some LIC problems certainly emanate from those

relationships (e.g., narco-terrorism in Colombia and Bolivia).
Guerrillas or insurgents, terrorists, and subversives are
themselves likely to be considered illegal, at least as far as
17

The Grenada operation holds numerous examples of problems
which may ensue when SOF attempt to coordinate with conventional
forces which have little sens~tivity to SOF requirements in this
area.
18

Colonel Ray E. Stratton, USAF (now ret'd.), former
Commandant of the USAF Special Operations School. Personal
Interview: Crystal City, VA, October 1985.
19

Interview, Yarborough, op. cit ••
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threatened governments are concerned; for example, Chiang Kai-Shek's
efforts to rid China of Mao Tse-Tung and his communist movement
were known as "Bandit Suppression" campaigns.

SF of the early

1960's were frequently referred to as "bandits,· at least in the
context of catching guerrilla "bandits."

Perhaps such associations

have encouraged American cultural reservations about SOF (especially
the terminology applied to them) and the nature of LIC -- that
is, that both are unfair, unsavory, immoral, and somehow illegal.20
In a legalistic society with a strong sense of moral propriety,
such perceptions reduce the viability of SOF and the effectiveness of U.S. LIC approaches.

Legal principles, of

course~

set

norms for behavior within society and tend to reflect mainstream
societal viewpoints.
the law is invoked.

When those norms are ignored or violated,
Because special operations may violate

cultural norms, they may activate a cultural perception that
special operations are inherently "illegal."

Those same legal

and moral parameters can be so confining, though, that SOF may
appeal to a romantic "outlaw" image

~n

American society.

In his

book Military Elites, Roger Beaumont identified the propensity on
the part of elite forces to develop an outlaw self-image.21
Nonetheless, SOF operations fall outside the realm of military
normalcy and the society it reflects, so SOF unconventionality
may tend to be equated with outlaws.
20

Hays w. Parks, Office of the Adjutant General of the
Army, Personal Interview. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 1985.
21

Roger A. Beaumont. Military Elites. The BobbsMerrill Company:
Indianapolis, IN, 1974, P• 192.
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(6)

When SOF deploy, particularly in LIC situations, enlisted

men, not officers, are the focal point.

For that reason, many

conventional commanders cringe at the thought of an SF sergeant
making critical field decisions, especially since NCO's and
enlistees are not traditionally recognized for their decision-making.
The command, control, and communications (C3) aspect, then, of
SOF operations is important to consider.

Conventionallyoriented

military leaders who know little about the nature of SOF and
their unique capabilities may misuse these forces.

As noted

previously, few military leaders would want to shoulder the
responsibility for the failure of special operations, especiallly
when they must delegate considerable authority to the field.
Structural changes which would allow SOF officers greater control
of their operations would seem logical.

Again, however, flag-rank

SOF officers are few in number.
Individuals are critical to special operations success, not
numbers as is often the case with conventional operations.

Too

many operators could be counterproductive to a special operation
due to the low-profile nature of the operations.

SF operations

in particular depend on the individual and his creativity.
promotion of self-reliance will be discussed in Chapter III.

SOF
It

may be that U.S. problems with LIC stem from a limited understanding
of the necessity of effective individuals, both our own soldiers
and the foreign nationals with whom they might work.
A national penchant for quantifying problems sidesteps the
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individual human element and the often subjective nature of LIC.
That tendency may challenge the development of the understanding
needed for the U.S. to succeed in the microcosmic arenas in which
it might use SOF.22
of Defense Robert

s.

A statement on Vietnam in 1962 by then-Secretary
McNamara is indicative of that perspective:

"Every quantitative measurement we have shows we're winning this
war." 23

Vhile empirical data may be of use for studying LIC

phenomena, LIC seems to have a subjective nature which can frustrate
a technologically-developed and quantitatively-oriented nation.
Like intelligence assets, SOF can provide an unquantifiable
on-scene interpretation of events which cannot be supplied by national
technical means.

(7)

Of course, any military undertaking, to follow Clausewitzian

logic, has political underpinnings and an essentially political
objective.

In LIC, however, political and psychological goals

surge to the forefront and military operations may take the
backseat, emerging only to complement or punctuate other goals.
SOF are well-suited to that environment.

Political awareness is

especially pertinent to those SOF operations requiring cooperation
with indigenous peoples.
22

Since the U.S. military is traditionally

Major Thomas Custer, USA, JSOA, 7th SF Group, Personal
Interview. Washington, D.C.: November 1985. Custer highlighted
his point by explaining that in SF demolition operations, the
"P" factor (for our purposes, •p• for plenty) may get the job
done when it is difficult to determine how much explosive to use.
For example, Colonel "Bull" Simons doubled the charges his demolilitions men ·thought to be enough for the Son Tay raid.
23 p. 412, Hilsman.
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circumscribed in American politics and is considered an apolitical
servant to the state, conventional forces may not be attuned to
or interested in the political nature of LIC activities or of the
significant roles often played by military forces in Third World
politics.
To be effective in interacting with foreigners and in attempting
to assimilate foreign cultures, SF, PSYOP, and Civil Affairs units
have special needs for language training and area-orientation.

As

noted, strike and protracted operations are fundamentally different,
so that Rangers and other strike operators have less need for
languages and area skills.

There are, however, instances in which

those skills could be useful to strike forces, such as for crosstrainLng and instructive purposes and for counter-terror operations
dependent upon foreign assistance.24

(8)

SOF may need unusual equipment, often inaccessible through

ordinary procurement channels.

For example, during preparations

for the Son Tay raid into North Vietnam, planners encountered
numerous problems attempting to obtaih suitable equipment, such
as night sights for their rifles. 25

Colonel Beckwith experienced

24

Considering that Delta Force has advised foreign forces
in several publicized instances,. language capabilities may be
useful for them as well. The refined nature of hostage rescue
and other direct action special operations demands literally that
nothing be lost in translation.
25

For numerous examples, see Benjamin Schemmer, The Raid.
Harper & Row Publishers:
New York, 1976.
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many of the same obstacles in attempting to outfit Delta Force.

26

SF, by contrast, ·probably relies less on equipment than other
troops.

They are trained to improvise and scrounge •••• They

don't need sophisticated weapons.·27

Because technology is such

an American strong suit, technological solutions to misunderstood
problems are alluring.
SOF equipment may have to be tailored to .the unique requirements
of the situation, sometimes because their needs are too primitive
for up-to-date military acquisitions.

As Arthur Schlesinger

noted in A Thousand Days:
The professionals, infatuated with the newest technology and eager to strike major blows, deeply disliked
the thought of reversion to the rude weapons, amateur
28
tactics, hard life and marginal effects of guerrilla warfare.
Though SOF needs for certain specialized missions may be
more exotic than those generally required by SF, neither has a
potential equipment pool which is likely to be of standard issue
and which may be requisitioned through normal channels.

Therefore,

a flexible procurement program and .developmental process which
extends beyond or bypasses bureaucratic processes would be practical
for SOF.

Unusual requirements and non-standard (and sometimes

secretive) methods inevitably work against the grain of bureaucratic
procedures, and they may raise questions about the propriety and
legality of SOF acquisitions.

For example, a number of recent

26

See Beckwith, op. cit ••

27

Blaufarb, op. cit. (quoting General Yarborough), p. 79.

28

Schlesinger, op. cit., P• 318.
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cases brought by the Army have accused SOF of accounting improprieties. 29

(9)

Because foes may not be clearly defined, there is a pervasive

ambiguity to LIC.

When SOF are used in these situations, there

is no guarantee of success or of popular sentiments in support of
U.S. involvement.

A democratically-based Army such as ours

reflects those feelings; military leadership, then, has little
desire to engage forces in what may be politically "loaded"
events.

Within the military, there is acute awareness of this

.

issue for noone wants association with a botched operation which
embarrases our country.
High-profile special operations can make or break careers,
within and without the military.

For instance, it is not hard

to imagine how the 1980 Presidential election could have been
affected by a successful rescue of the U.S. hostages held in
Iran.

It takes courage to take the risks of special operations;

they are high-risk, high-gain affairs~ 3 0

Though SOF units are

willing to take the risks in the field, our political and military
leaders must develop a better understanding of SOF limitations
and capabilities to be able to use them with wisdom.31
29

Decision-

See Washington Post, op. cit ••

JO Letter from Colonel Colonel Charlie A. Beckwith, USA
(ret'd.), former commander of Delta Force: November 11, 1984.
Jl In retrospective looks at Vietnam, some military leaders
have criticized what they saw as excessive civilian control of a
military problem. · On the other hand, few civilian leaders of
consequence had developed an understanding of the nature of the

47

making for today's special operations missions may be quite
time-compressed, so it is imperative that political leaders be
.
32
i n f orme d an d prepare d f or SOF cont i ngencies.

(IO)

Elites run counter to the precepts of a democratic society,

so they create special assimilation problems within the military.
Elitism, to some observers, can damage overall troop morale by
focusing attention on a few and spiriting away the best talent
and most ·warrior-oriented· men from line units.

For the types

of operations SOF conduct, however, exceptional training and high
morale is essential, because SOF must feel that they are capable
of incredible feats.

When exceptional men are pooled and trained

together, elitist attitudes are difficult to avoid.33

Conventional

commanders would rather not allow their best soldiers to follow
the siren song and attraction of SF, Rangers, or Delta -- it is in
their parochial interest, then, to reduce elites to a common
denominator.
above;

SF, for example, takes only Sargeants (E-6's) and

these quality NCO's could fill manpower slots in the

mainstream.

Yet, conventional leadership can be incredulous that

conflict comprehensive enough to offer something different.
As U.S. military commitments stepped-up, the special warfare
community, which probably could have offered alternative approaches to the conflict, became even more circumscribed by the
bureaucracy.
32

For example, Britain•s Margaret Thatcher is involved in
some SAS training operations. By contrast, American President
Jimmy Carter did not make his first visit to Delta Force's Fort Bragg
headquarters until after the failure of the Iran mission.
33

See Cohen's Commandos and Politicians and Roger Beaumont's
Military Elites for further analysis of the elite factor.
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SOF acceptance standards are too high for many men within the
military mainstream.

As Donald Duncan pointed out about the low

acceptance rates into SF during the early 1960's:
Regular Brass ref used to believe that such a large
percentage of men in the Regular Army were academically
unqualified ~~d decided that the fault lay with inferior
instruction.
In the 1970's, Colonel Charlie Beckwith even encountered resistance
within the special warfare community in his efforts to recruit
for Delta Force, apparently because of fears that the new unit
might drain other special operations units.

Such fears, then,

are not endemic only to conventional forces.35
Symbols of elitism, however, have always been anathema to
the mainstream.

President John F. Kennedy's sanction of the

weari~g of the green beret by SF was an official, albeit civilian,

legitimation of an elite symbol abolished during the 19SO's;
ironically by Kennedy's Special Group (Counterinsurgency) Chairman,
General Maxwell Taylor.36

Since most military leaders were

unreceptive to Kennedy's counterinsurgency overtures anyway, his
sanction of the beret must have further irritated traditionalists.
Considering Colonel Darby's eschewment of a Ranger beret during
WWII and longstanding Army proscriptions against special headgear
and other elite symbols, distinctive berets probably provoked
resentment for SF by conventional forces, some of whom lampooned
34
35
36

Duncan, op. cit., P• 191.
Beckwith, op. cit., PP• 107-114.
Blaufarb, op. cit., pp. 79-80.
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the SF "green beanies.· 37

As a way of watering down an exclusive

symbol, military leaders later allowed other military SOF and
even airborne units to wear various types of berets.

Such symbols

undoubtedly have created assimilation problems for SOF.

(11)

It seems that the foundations of modern warfare rest upon

traditional or European thought, that is, upon the reading of
Clausewitz.

Although Clausewitz's intentions could be debated,

the modern applications have been clear.

From an.American per-

spective, his adage about war as a continuation of politics by
other means has probably been considered an aberration, because
we seem to consider warfare to be an abhorrent state.

Perhaps

Clausewitz did not see the total application of national resources
as the final extension of politics.

Whatever the case, SOF operations

seem to devolve from a different perspective, one which places more
emphasis on the individual, the shrewdness of leaders, the psychological strength of adversaries, and an indirect approach to
warfare.

The writings of Chinese author Sun Tzu on warfare seem

closely aligned with SOF activities. 38

Mao Tse-Tung drew heavily

on Sun Tzu for his principles of guerrilla warfare and People's
War, as did Ho Chi Mirih and General Giap in Vietnam.

Perhaps,

37
David Stirling, founder of the British Special Air
Service, discovered that a distinguishing beret promoted resentment
by regular soldiers (and started many a bar fight to boot). See
Cohen, op. cit., p. 55.
'
38
Sarkesian, manuscript, op. cit., p. 25. See Sun Tzu's
The Art of War. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith. Oxford University
Press: London, 1963.

50

then, Asian thought is more applicable to SOF than is

Wes~ern.

Special operations have been described as "a form of military
judo,"39 an apt description in light of the previous assertions.
It seems that martial arts, and perhaps martial qualities, which
reflect and deflect tensions between humans at the personal
conflict level, become tempered in American society.

SOF operations

demand an understanding of individual and group motivations, and
they are likely to involve personal combat.

Not surprisingly,

many SOF personnel are not only trained extensively in hand-to-hand
combat but also seem to operate with a philosophy similar to
Asian martial artists.

40

As an impetus to Asia's martial traditions, Sun Tzu's The
Art of War could be considered the philosophical stimulus to
special warfare.

To quote Sun Tzu:

All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when
capable, feign incapacity; when active, inactivity. When
near, make it appe!I that you are far away; when far away,
that you are near.
For Sun Tzu, weapons were less important than deception and
attacking the enemy's strategy and mind:

"weapons are ominous

tools to be used only when there is no alternative.· 42

Sun Tzu

could be considered the first written proponent of psychological
39

Interview# 1, Wilson, op. cit ••

40 The second part of this assertion must be considered
speculation drawn from personal experiences and reflections from
interviews with SOF soldiers.
41
42

Sun Tzu, op. cit., P• 66.
Sun Tzu, p.40.
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warfare.

He suggested that one should ·anger his general and

confuse him.

Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance.· 43

Considering longstanding American military successes and general
battlefield superiority in Vietnam, it should be apparent that
the National Liberation Front, General Giap, and the North Vietnamese
Politburo understood Sun Tzu and the political and psychological
dimensions of the Vietnam conflict.
Long before American SOF or modern commandos emerged, Sun
Tzu's philosophy had given rise to an unsual breed of adherents
i n J apan

.
.44
k nown as - n i nJa.

Their art of ninjitsu, also known

as "the art of invisibility,• emphasized stealth and surprise,
deception and diversion, patience and mental strength, and physical
prowess.

Ninja were utilized frequently by warlords during

the internecine conflicts which shattered Japan between 1300-1700
A.D ••

They played roles as intelligence and counter-intelligence

agents, assassins, terrorists, guerrillas, spearheads for conventional
attacks, unconventional
warriors.

(behind~the-lines)

forces, and psychological

45

Ninja, who were masters of a dizzying array of weaponry and
a plethora of disguises, accomplished their wide variety of
missions because they.were supremely flexible and adaptable

43

Sun Tzu, p. 67.
53-54 gave me the clues.

Samuel Griffith's commentary on P•

44 Though scholars have debated their origins, most believe
that ninja found their principles through reading Sun Tzu. See
chapter 1 of Andrew Adams, Ninja: The Invisible Assassins. Ohara
Publications, Inc.: Los Angeles, CA, 1970.
45

Ibid.
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warriors.

One day a ninja might appear as a priest, another as

an itinerant farmer -- consider the similarity of the Viet Cong,
farmer by day, guerrilla by night.

Unlike revolutionaries,

ninja were not absorbed by ideological and philosophical concerns,
and they generally operated as direct action elements at the
behest of the warlord who had their allegiance.
Reviewing ninja roles and missions, it would seem that SOF
have much more in common with these ancient shadow warriors than
with modern conventional soldiers.

Unlike the ninja, American

SOF have adopted advisory roles in which nation-building efforts
may require civic action and training missions.

Nonetheless, Sun

Tzu's aphorisms are as easily applied to SOF as to feudal Japanese
ninja -- they certainly have not been lost on today's terrorists
and guerrillas.

A pertinent quote from Sun Tzu can be found for

almost every SOF operating characteristic or individual trait
discussed in this and the following chapter.

While these characteristics are not representative of all
those which distinguish SOF and conventional forces, they seem to
be the most critical.

Since SOF are dependent upon individuals

and units which are characteristically small and elite, the third
chapter will take a look at the type of individual involved in
special operations.

In the process, it will develop the traits

and attributes which make the SOF soldier adaptable to changing
requirements and new environments.

Chapter III.

The SOF Individual

In special operations, the .individual is the essence of the
operational art.

Therefore, this chapter will attempt to outline

the unusual traits which may best describe the SOF soldier and
which seem to distinguish him from the conventional soldier.

It

will also examine distinctions within SOF which may provide a
useful framework for analysis for determining how SOF assets are
best applied to LIC.
What attracts men to special operations forces?

Is it the rugged

training, the espirit de corps and elite nature, the challenges and
built-in dangers of their missions, or a fierce warrior orientation?
Or are they comfortable with an outlaw image as discussed in
Chapter II, situated on the fringe of military norms?

The answer

lies probably in some combination of these factors coupled with a
desire to exceed or to avoid what they may see as the

l~aitations

of modern conventional soldiering.
SOF often attract the daring, the adventurous, the innovative,
and the physically tough: a macho image, some would say self-image,
surrounds these elite forces.

The SOF mystique has captured the

imagination of practitioners, proponents, and, periodically, the
American public, just.as it did for SF benefactor John F. Kennedy.I
To the detriment of SOF, this image can exceed reality and fuel
misconceptions which are, in turn, perpetuated in the public mind
1

Blaufarb's Counterinsurgency Era, Hilsman's To Move a
Nation, Schlesinger's A Thousand Days, and Halberstam's The Best
and the Brightest all discuss Kennedy's fascination (and the
public's) with Special Forces.
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and the military mainstream by films such as those of the Rambo

Although SF has tried to lose the ·killer· image, the brutal
commando skills and the

v~olent

aspects of their operations

portrayed in films of this genre seem imbedded in our national
consciousness. 2

The image has not been lost on conventional

forces, either, who have often viewed SOF as
bad officer candidates." 3

··~·

g?od killers but

Movies in which commandos eliminate

guerrilla and terrorist "punks" (as would Dirty Harry with criminals)
may serve as a societal catharsis for cultural frustrations
over LIC, but they tend to reduce complex problems to a simplistic
"good-guy,

bad~guy"

equation.

An American "Manichean outlook,-

as one SOF proponent called it, may frustrate American efforts
with LIC, because LIC cannot be reduced to such simplistic terms.
David Halberstam wryly described SF as • ••• the extraordinary
physical specimens and intellectual PhD's swinging from trees,
speaking Russian and Chinese, eating snake meat and other fauna
at night, springing counter-ambushes on unwary Asian ambushers
who had read Mao and Giap but not Hilsman and Rostow.· 4
fanciful and somewhat

tongue-in-cheek~

Certainly

his words, nonetheless,

probably mirrored an American public perception in the 1960's
that SF were a sort of modern-day Daniel Boone.

2

In that sense,

Lt. Colonel Andrew S. Dulina, USA, PAO, 1st SOCOM, SF.
Personal interview, Ft. Bragg, N.C.: November 9, 1985.
3

4

Jannarone, op. cit., P• 10.
Halberstam, op.cit., P• 154.
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SF may have appealed to an American "frontier mentality" and a
national self-image of an adaptable, resolute, and solution-oriented
people. 5

In their heyday, SF developed a cult status -- a

popular song and a movie starring John Wayne extolled their
skills.

Even G.I. Joe joined Special Forces. 6

Despite the

absence of a public relations campaign as accompanied SF in the
1960's and the extraordinary secrecy surrounding counter-terrorist
units, it is intriguing that today's children thrill to a G.I.
Joe doll who is a member of Delta Force.
The modern "men of the Green Beret" are not much

d~fferent

from their 1960's predecessors, but today's SF have received far
less publicity than they did during Kennedy's counterinsurgency
era.

The special warfare community has filled out and become

more diverse since the first build-up, and it now encompasses a
wide array of talented men.

Why are these men, among our national

military assets, most apt to discern important distinctions and
function well in LIC situations?
(1)

SOF operate at the most personal levels of warfare. The SOF
soldier's mindset and approach to problems is similar to
the feudal Japanese ninja's. Like the ninja, the SOF soldier's
training can be exceptionally demanding and harsh, so it promotes
an attitude which can overcome the seeming insurmountable nature
of some of his tasks.

(2)

Individuals and closely-knit teams comprise SOF.
is their trademark, individualism a byproduct.

5

Self-reliance

Cohen, op. cit., P• 51.

6 Duncan's New Legions, op.cit., stirred these personal
recollections.
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(3)

Some SOF soldiers are attuned to a political, psychological,
and social "feel" for their missions, a concept uncharacteristic
of conventional forces.

(4)

Creativity and innovativeness are SOF hallmarks which may
lead to friction with conventional forces by working against
standard procedures and traditional viewpoints.

(5)

Operational and individual flexibility is endemic to SOF.
They are unbound by tradition and adaptable to changing
mission requirements and new tasks.

Each of these traits will be reviewed carefully.
(1)

In describing the type of individual best suited to SF, Douglas

Blaufarb noted that SF " ••• sought men ••• (who had) a liking for
perso.na 1 com b at. .7

In that sense, the conventional soldier may

no longer be considered a true "warrior," since he is likely to
be far removed from killing the enemy.

Although he may be the

arbiter of his own fate through manipulation of machinery, the
conventional soldier is more dependent upon weapons technology
than on human capabilities.

Modern conventional warfare, it

seems, has become so depersonalized that there is no need to
"know the enemy," only to know his technical capabilities.8
As modern warfare goes, then, SOF would seem to be an anachronism, albeit with a modern twist.
7

Although the SOF soldier may

Blaufarb, op. cit., P• 79.

8 See Gwynne Dyer's War, Dorsey Press: Homewood, IL,
1985, pp. 156-172, which offers an interesting assessment of the
changing roles of the soldier and the nature of the "military
ethic" produced by the impact of modern technology on warfare.
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engage in close-quarters combat, expectations placed on SOF (at
least as applied to commando and counter-terror forces) have
raised them, ironically, to a level of automaton-like efficiency
which is quite impersonal.

Before the advent of counter-terrorist

units, however, Roger Beaumont discussed SF and other elites in
the context of this cybernetic trend in his book, Military Elites.9
In an age of revolution, terrorism, and subversion, the need for
discrete applications of force, represented by the deadly efficiency
of commando units such as Delta Force, British SAS, and German
GSG9, may be said to be indicative of the conditions of our time.
Nonetheless, SF and the non-combat SOF units need such exceptional interpersonal skills and penetrating insight that a cybernetic
label seems inappropriate to them.
Chapter I I drew parallels between special operations, the
philosophy of Sun Tzu, and ninjitsu, asserting that ninja practitioners are the historical antecedents to modern SOF.

An aura

of secrecy which surrounded the ninja warrior promoted misconceptions
and elevated him to an almost mythological stature -- which held
that the ninja was capable of flight, invisibility, and other
superhuman feats.

The ninja also exploited their knowledge of

deception and diversion to contribute to their surreal image and
effectiveness.

For example, ninja frequently wore disguises and

spread rumors and propaganda; they even played on popular Japanese
9

Beaumont, op. cit., pp. 113-147, 191-192.
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fears about demons by occasionally wearing devil masks. 10

Like

modern counter-terrorist units and CIA operatives, ninja also
relied heavily upon anonymity and secrecy.
Germane to the conditions of civil war enveloping Japan at
the time, ninja were incredibly well-rounded troops developed
from Sun Tzu's emphasis on the utility of secret agents, what
might be considered the original "Fifth Columnists.· 11

The

ninja's incessant physical training and incredible variety of
skills made him a combination of modern-day CIA case officer,
SF soldier, and Ranger, a multi-talented individual who believed
nothing to be impossible. 12

SOF origins and institutional development

have organized SOF around certain specialties (despite the confusion
discussed in Chapter I), just as ninja clans specialized in
~

different aspects of ninjitsu.

Nonetheless, a cross-section of

SOF skills bears a remarkable resemblance in toto to the more
holistic art of ninjitsu.

(2)

SOF are made up of closely-knit, highly-integrated tea•s which

require soldiers to have a refined sense of teamwork and an
ability to complement others' special skills.

Coordinated effort

is the essence of strike and counter-terror operations performed
10

See Adams, op. cit.. Similarly, General Blackburn's
WWII guerrillas in Luzon stirred up local fears about vampires by
puncturing the necks of dead Japanese soldiers. From interview,
Blackburn, op. cit ••
11
12

Sun Tzu, op. cit., pp. 146-149.
Adams, op. cit., P• 106.
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by Rangers, SEALs, or Delta Force.
nucleus of a twelve-man A-Team.

SF is organized around the

Since SF cross-train in another

specialty and may require wide latitude in the field, a self-reliant
individual may be even more important to SF than to strike forces.
According to a British SAS soldier, the SAS considers self-reliance critical to special operations success because soldiers
exhibiting this trait usually work equally well individually or
in groups. 13

In special operations, operators may be distanced

from the command and control mechanism, wield great field authority,
and lack an outside support network, so for all SOF endeavors,
self-reliance is a singularly important individual attribute.
This SOF trait, however, can lead to a feeling of independence
or individualism uncommon to conventional forces.

SOF soldiers

have been known to refuse orders on occasion; they may ask for
such refined operational details that SOF may seem to be "splitting
hairs,· but the nature of their operations demands precision and
precise detail. 14

Some of these instances undoubtedly have

resulted from a conventional misunderstanding of SOF capabilities,
but, to be sure, uncooperative and super-inquisitive SOF soldiers
have probably aroused conventional antipathy toward SOF.
Besides an independent orientation, SOF soldiers may retain
an individualism which runs counter to a conventional training
process that strips individual civilian identities and encourages
13

Major John Holmes, SAS liaison at the British Embassy,
Personal Interview, Washington, D.C.: November 13, 1985.
14

op. cit ••

Interview, Farrell, op. cit ••

Also, interview, Custer,
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.
15
identification with the group and the greater whole of the service.
Elite forces seem to provide outlets for individualists who
might see themselves encumbered by a ponderous and stratified
bureaucracy.

This attraction leads SOF soldiers to eschew what

they would consider to be some of the more mundane tasks of modern
conventional soldiering such as management and finance.

An

overwhelming mission orientation, a common trait among SOF soldiers,
drives SOF to associate with like-minded thinkers and paradoxically
propels them away from the very skills they need to promote their
acceptance by the mainstream.

(3)

Because special operations requirements continually evolve,

the special operator tends to be an innovator who sometimes
circumnavigates bureaucratic impediments to secure his needs.
For example, Air Force SOF at the "skunk works" of Hurlburt Field
have developed much.of the specialized radio equipment used by
SOF airmen. 16

Likewise, for the Son Tay raid and the Iran

rescue operation, SOF soldiers modified existing equipment such.
as M-79 grenade vests and ordered other special gear, relying
heavily on the Sears and Roebuck catalogue and other outside
15

See Duncan, op. cit •• His description of the dehumanizing
induction and training process is interesting -- but he omits
discussion of the distinguishing character of the SF soldier.
See also Dyer, Chapter 5, op. cit ••
16

"Skunk Works· Armed Forces Journal International, June
1986, PP• 76-77.
Similarly, an Army SOF aviator pointed out a
strut which he had modified for the UH-60 Blackhawk used for SOF
missions and informed me that Army SOF aviators often have developed
features for SOF missions which the aircraft manufacturers overlooked.
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sources.17

As suggested in Chapter II, against a relatively

inflexible bureaucratic backdrop, SOF creativity can prove irksome
to soldiers accustomed to going "by-the-book."
SOF operators are also known for their creative and intelligent
approaches to field mission requirements.

One well-publicized

example is that of the Ranger officer during the Grenada operation
who, unable to communicate through his radio equipment, called in
fire support by dialing Fort Bragg on AT&T telephone lines.

In

the conventional military, soldiers are taught to follow the
manual, not to arrive at their own conclusions or to develop
their own solutions; SOF self-reliance encourages individual
initiative.

As one SOF soldier put it, "the U.S. Army does not

recognize brilliance or individuals ••• it does not teach its
soldiers to think." 18

His assertion was not meant to be harsh or

immodest, merely to indicate that a significant difference between
SOF and conventional forces is that SOF allow far more room for
individual creativity and thought.

As pointed out in Chapter II,

SOF rely on NCO's and enlisted men for their operations. Therefore,
these individuals must be intellectually capable of analyzing
complex problems and attempting to find solutions for them,
sometimes in the field.

(4)

Because SOF soldiers in SF, PSYOPs, and Civil Affairs tend

17

For examples, see Schemmer, op. cit., and Beckwith, op.

18

Non-attributable interview.

cit ••
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to be adept at assimilating foreign cultures, they may be asked
to promote harmony between host governments, military forces, and
indigenous populations.

SOF individuals often develop a feel for

the political, social, and psychological nuances of their operational
areas.

SF and Civil Affairs troops may adopt local customs or

participate in local rituals periodically to improve interaction
For instance, SF soldiers working with

with indigenous peoples.

the Montagnards of South Vietnam often wore jewelry which was
given to them as a gift to symbolize the friendship between the
tribe and the Americans.

Such adornments often met with scorn

from conventional forces in Vietnam.

19

SOF sometimes delve into subject areas not normally asssociated
with the military domain.

For example, the author once listened

to two SF NCO's carrying on a highly-articulate discussion about
religion in the Third World.

In dealing with foreign nationals,

conventional soldiers would be less likely than SOF to take
non-military factors such as religion into account.

Sensitivity

to tribal idiosyncracies and what may seem to be minor local
considerations could be essential to the success of SF, PSYOPs,
and Civil Affairs missions.
Patience is an important trait for SOF in advisory roles,
one more common to SF and Civil Affairs soldiers than to strike
19

Interview, Lunger, op. cit •• Durittg Vietnam, many
conventional officers were also frustrated by the unkempt and
'"uµmilitary" appearances of SF troops, referring to them disparagingly
as "long hairs.· Perhaps they meant to equate SF with the counterculture hippies, who tended to be anti-establishment and antimilitary.
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forces; a cultural perception that American "know-how" is preeminent
stimulates a dilemma as to whether Americans should take the lead
and dominate host approaches or allow an indigenous solution to
problem areas.

Long-term cross-cultural contact, particularly in

a hostile environment, requires a special breed of soldier who
reflects and thinks carefully before he acts.

Patience, then,

should be sought as a distinctive individual trait in selecting
men for advisory roles in protracted conflicts, mobile training
.
20
. i c act i on proJects.
teams, an d civ

(5)

In special operations, each operation is likely to be a

completely new enterprise, a unique experience which may make
irrelevant preparations based on previous operations.

Without a

flexibility of mind and doctrine, SOF may be locked into essentially
bureaucratic approaches, a formula which could lead to disaster
in special operations.

Among SOF traits, flexibility and adaptability

are the most important to this study.
In their advisory role, SOF are the "eyes and ears" of an
American presence, functioning, as suggested in Chapter II, like
CIA-field operatives.

When SOF are assigned to CIA operational

control, flexibility is needed for a dual allegiance and adaptability
for interaction with civilian professionals.

Even when that

situation does not exist, SOF must breach traditional reconnaissance concepts to act symbiotically with intelligence assets
in discerning and reporting field developments.
20

Barnett, op. cit., p. 224.

Adapting to
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intelligence roles in a foreign environment can be difficult, but
SOF soldiers have accomplished the transition many times.21
SOF have usually adapted to new missions successfully, even
those far apart from their conceptual basis.

For example, SF

elements were specially trained for the Son Tay raid in 1970;
more recently, an SF contingent under the command of Colonel
Robert Kountel was organized for counter-terror missions during
the interim development of Delta Force.

As Chapter I

emphasized,

Ranger concepts have been so intermingled with those of SF that
commando operations are of ten assumed to be an integral part of the
SF mission.

But as other authors have pointed out, alternative

forces were unavailable at those junctures where specialized
missions were needed, so SF seemed to be the logical choice for the
operations.
The nature of Ranger and other strike operations seems
to encourage an aggressive approach among these forces, .but we
should not assume that they may adopt the ·1et's get on with it•
attitude, for Rangers have proven to be patient, reflective, and
adaptable as well.

For example, at least one Ranger battalion

now trains in guerrilla and counter-guerrilla tactics (though not
organization and training of such forces as conducted by SF).22
Moreover, some Rangers have cross-trained with SF, earning both
21

Ibid., PP• 187-190.

22

Gung-Ho, op. cit., pp. 82-83.
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the Ranger tab and the SF beret.

23

On the whole, however, SF soldiers tend to be older, wiser,
more reflective, and more aware of the political nature of special
operations than are Rangers. 2 4

That is not to say that SF are

better soldiers, just that there are often age and experience
differences between these forces which suit SF for advisory roles
in protracted conflicts.

In contrast, direct action missions in

most cases would best be conducted by Rangers and other strike forces.
Although there are organizational and operational differences
between SF and Rangers, their talents are not mutually exclusive.
Individual cases support this notion.

For example, Colonel

Charlie Beckwith commanded line (conventional) units,

wa~

commandant

of the Ranger school, worked in SF, and oversaw the development
of De·lta Force. 25

To fill such a variety of roles, he must have

been quite adaptable.

Lt. Colonel Arthur "Bull" Simons, who had

a Ranger background and led some Asian theater commando operations
in WWII, ran the clandestine White Star program in Laos in 1959-60
and later led the raid on Son Tay prison in 1970.

After his military

retirement, Colonel Simons would lead a group of civilians into
Iran on a celebrated mission to free two illegally detained
employees of an American corporation.

If the portrayal of Colonel

Simons in a popular book is accurate, he was an extremely adaptable
23

Captain Benjamin Weiss, U.S. Army Rangers, USJFKSWC,
Personal interview. Fort Bragg, NC: November 7, 1985.
24

Interview# 2, Wilson, op. cit ••

25

See Beckwith, op. cit ••
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individual, especially considering that his role in Iran was not
military in orientation.26
The incredible operational detail needed for raids and
other SOF missions demands flexibility, for special operations
requirements are difficult to forecast.

Indeed, a miscalculation

during the Son Tay mission landed part of the assault force in
the wrong compound, but both assault teams reacted calmly and
carried on with their missions. 27

American approaches to special

operations have been noted for their

ad~

nature, that is,

capabilities and coordination have been developed from a standing
start, especially for the hostage rescue/counter-terror mission.
It may be that American culture contributes to ad

.!!.2.£

approaches

to special operations, for we seem to be an impatient people who
woul~

rather not tackle the fine operational detail needed for

direct action missions and the frustrations which may ensue from
advisory missions in foreign lands.
The flexibility of SOF individuals and units dovetails
nicely with adaptability and improves the prospects for success
in special operations missions.

U~til

recently, however, the

lack of a joint training and command· structure for SOF units has
failed to maximize SOF flexibility and adaptability.

Such an

organization now exists (JSOC), but it is oriented primarily
toward direct action

counte~terrorist

26

missions, which are only

See Ken Follett. On Wings of Eagles. New American Library:
New York, 1984, PP• 56-57. For further insight into Simons, also
see Schemmer, op. cit ••
27

See Schemmer, op. cit ••
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one facet of the LIC challenge.

The SOF attributes or traits discussed in this chapter could
have served as the basis for the entire thesis, but alone they
explain only part of a complex issue.

As the introduction and

earlier chapters have suggested, LIC and special operations are
closely tied to the efforts of individuals, so it is imperative
that we understand personal traits which tend to distinguish SOF
from other DoD forces and which make SOF suitable for LIC.

For

the SOF selection process, certain attributes are more desirable
than others and should be the subject of careful analysis.

Conclusion and Policy Implications
Since Chapter III addressed SOF traits, it is appropriate
to begin this final section with an examination of the SOF selection
process.

In an historical sense, the 1980's military build-up

presents similarities to that of the 1960's, because both relied
on solid backing by political proponents, including White House
supporters, and have been characterized by a relatively quick
expansionary process (the current expansion is ongoing).

Some

SOF advocates feel that the recruitment of large numbers of new
troops may detract from the quality of soldier selected for SOF,
and they argue that special operations is a sophisticated, professional enterprise ill-suited to amateurs.

SF probably suffered

this overexpansionary fate in the 1960's 1 as it ballooned from
1500 to 9000 soldiers in one year. 1

One author has suggested

that many SF soldiers of the 1960's "deplored the fast build-up,
the lowering of standards, the end of exclusivity, the publicity,
the destruction of eliteness except in name.· 2
Some observers have suggested that elites by their nature
cannot be so large anyway, arguing that at some point quality
suffers and effectiveness declines. 3

It seems that the talents

needed to fulfill SOF expansionary goals exist in our society,
but the qualities which SOF seek are not those ordinarily found
in conventional forces.

Even when desirable SOF traits are found

1

Russell F. Weigley. History of the United States Army.
The MacMillan Company: New York, 1967, p. 432.

2
3

Duncan, op. cit., p. 195.
Interviews, Farrell, Wilson I

2, op. cit ••
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in line unit soldiers, they may be camoflauged by the requirements
of conventional and strategic warfare, or those individuals
may be inaccessable to SOF recruiters.

For example, when the

Iran mission requirements dictated that Delta Force acquire a
soldier fluent in Farsi who could serve as a DoD penetration
agent, an Air Force sergeant was discovered who fit their needs.4
The search for such an individual, however, was expedited because
the hostage matter was considered one of national urgency.
During non-crisis periods, the military recruitment pool is
unlikely to be so open.
SOF should seek particularly needed skills from a broader
cross-section of the population outside of the military, including
from government bureaucracies.

Useful linguistic capabilities and

applicable ethnic backgrounds should be sought (e.g., Hispanic
community for Latin America orientation), especially for PSYOPs,
Civil Affairs, and SF.

Perhaps even women should be recruited

for some roles in which there is little likelihood of combat.

In

that sense, Donald Duncan's assertion that SF recruitment in the
1960's was deliberately discriminatory against blacks is alarming
such a bias would eliminate an important recruiting base and
i t would obviously violate civil righ~s legislation. 5

Though

bureaucratic and institutional impediments might stifle creative
recruiting approaches, SOF proponents should consider any novel
4

Beckwith, op. cit., p. 212. As Beckwith noted, this
individual demonstrated great courage (and adaptability as well),
for he had no prior SOF or intelligence experience.
5

Duncan, op. cit., pp. 195-197.
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and feasible recruiting efforts to expand their potential manpower
base while avoiding a high-profile recruiting effort (as in the
1960's) which might seem to compete with the mainstream.
Since these elite forces are likely to be utilized and may
be depleted in conflict situations, they can suffer from what
Roger Beaumont called the ·selection-destruction cycle.·6

An

example of Beaumont's cycle would be the use of SF in Vietnam on
high-risk combat missions and in village defense operations
against numerically superior NLF/NVA forces.

These missions

killed off many highly-skilled SF soldiers.

As Bernard Fall

concluded,

"A dead Special Forces sergeant is not spontaneously

replaced by his own social environment.
usually is.· 7

A dead revolutionary

To avoid unnecessary attrition of SOF talent and

to employ them with wisdom, political and military leadership
must be aware of the unique qualities and capabilities which
characterize SOF.
As Colonel Beckwith demonstrated with Delta Force recruitment,
the SOF selection process can be improved by the formulation of a
psychological profile and a list of desirable attributes sought
for the various SOF units.

Such a profile might be enhanced by

the study of common philosophical ground shared by the Japanese
ninja and SOF.
6

Although all three chapters of this thesis have

Beaumont, op. cit., pp. 181-183.

7 Bernard Fall. Street Without Joy. The Stackpole Company:
Harrisburg, PA, 1963, p. 357. As quoted in Sam Sarkesian, "Amerian
Policy on Revolution and Counterrevolution: A Synthesis of the
Literature and Concepts.· Unpublished manuscript, n.d., p. 9.
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pointed out distinctions within the U.S. special warfare community
and identified peculiarities of SOF units, it may also be that many
SOF skills could be consolidated and integrated, as with the
British SAS and SBS (Special Boat Service), which perform operations
similar to those of the Delta Force, Rangers, and SEALs.

Like SAS,

American SOF could move through training rotations, for example,
six months in counter-terrorism (shooting house drills, etc.).
and another six months in reconnaissance and intelligence collection.8
Despite some concerns that certain missions may require great specialization (e.g., counter-terror), this tendency may actually detract
from American SOF capabiblities, because it pools too many talented
individuals who conceivably could take on other missions.

In

that sense, the development of a more holistic approach to SOF
skills may be beneficial.
Obviously, the difficult skills required for SOF aviation
would not be easily transferable nor would those of PSYOPs and
Civil Affairs forces.

The latter two groups are too lean already

considering the vastness of

LIC~

and they must be brought into the

mainstream of the current SOF renaissance -- even though they do
not fit traditional conceptions of special operations and may
develop as entities distinct from other SOF.
might serve as a

long~range

Although integration

boost to U.S. special operations

capabilities, parochialism, institutional longevity, and pride might
preclude such an effort.

On the other hand, LIC challenges

probably can be handled effectively by the current array of
8

Interview, Lunger, op. cit ••
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forces, assuming a completion of Secretary Weinberger's mandated
expansion, organizational

improv~ments,

and a conceptual synthesis

at the National Security Council level.
The above requirements will be difficult to achieve, primarily
because the DoD under which SOF are subsumed places strategic and
conventional warfare at the top of its list of priorities.

Due

to a highly capable Soviet strategic and conventional threat to
U.S. national security, DoD concerns are realistically skewed
toward high-intensity missions.

In that context, SOF are assign-

ed important tactical and strategic roles, but "dual-hatting• SOF
units with LIC and high-intensity missions may detract from
preparations for either.

Perhaps certain special warfare units

could be designated and trained specifically for conventional
conflicts, and, if necessary, provide support for SOF units in
low-intensity activities.

As General Yarborough put it, -Training

for the conventional mission is a full-time job.·9

The same

logic could be applied to SOF preparations for LIC.
SOF may not even be the on1y military forces required for
effective U.S. approaches to LIC; as the conflict scale moves
upward, conventional forces such as Marines, airborne units, Army
light infantry divisions, or forces attached to the USCENTCOM
(formerly the Rapid

D~ployment

Joint Task Force), may prove

useful for situations in which low-profile special operations
cannot defend U.S. strategic interests.

Just as SOF would support

conventional combat operations in wartime, conventional forces
9

Interview, Yarborough, op. cit ••
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may be needed to support SOF or even to resolve certain problems,
such as the Navy's satisfactory role in ending the Achille Lauro
episode.

On the lower end of the spectrum, SOF are only the

military part of a synergistic approach which requires a close
coordination between SOF, intelligence assets, and other U.S.
government agencies which may play roles abroad.

At all conflict

levels, there must be pre-existing relationships and thorough
interaction between government agencies, SOF, and conventional
forces so that smooth transitions from one emphasis to another
can be effected.
As with the relationship between conventional warfare and
tactical nuclear war, no line of demarcation clearly separates
LIC from either peace or conventional warfare.

Since Americans

seem to be obsessed by categories and classification, we would
0

like to "pigeonhole· each challenge.

Our chief adversary, the

Soviets, sees no such distinctions, preferring to view warfare in
its totality.

Leninist political warfare, then, reflects the

state of "peace,· a Byzantine concept which is totally alien
to Americans who tend to view warfare as a black and white dichotomy.
In American minds, the nation is either at war or at peace.

It

is time to shed this simplistic perspective in favor of a realistic
appraisal of the changes which have occurred since World War II.
As Colonel Dallas Cox put it, ·we~ at war now.·10
Director of Central Intelligence William Casey has argued
IO Colonel Dallas Cox, JSOA, Army Special Forces, Personal
Interview: Washington, D.C., October 17,1985.
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that the Soviets are utilizing a resource war strategy in which
surrogate entities wage covert warfare against the United States.11
Likewise, former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency,
Lt. General Samuel V. Wilson, USA (ret'd), has argued to the
effect that Soviet strategy is maritime in orientation and aimed
at critical chokepoints on world sealanes which could deny resources
to the United States. 12

What these men are saying is that the

Soviets have adapted to world changes and are employing a complex
strategy which has a definite LIC component.

The Soviets probably

have little desire or reason to engage us directly, where we are
strong.

Sun Tzu said, "When he concentrates, prepare against

him; where he is strong, avoid him.·l3

Our deterrence strategy,

in its conventional and strategic sense, has worked, and we have
avoided ·war· as we understand it.

But Sun Tzu al•o said:

To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles
is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without
fighting is the acme of skill •••• Thus, those skilled in
war subdue the enemy's army without battle.14
This seems to be the essence of Soviet strategy toward the United
States.
To our detriment, no single organization currently has
responsibility for studying and preparing for the new reality of
11

"Casey Speaks on Intelligence Role in Countering Terrorism,·
Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene. National Intelligence Study
Center, Publisher. Washington, D.C.: January 1986.

'

12

Interview I 1, Wilson, op. cit ••
cit., PP• 191-194.
13

P• 67, Sun Tzu, op. cit ••

14

Sun Tzu, PP• 77, 79.

See also Barnett, op.

75

LIC, because it is a still-evolving phenomenon full of ambiguity
and tied closely to political change.

Dr. Sam Sarkesian has

suggested a number of organizational changes which could vastly
improve U.S. cabilities for coordinating its assets for Lic.15
Yet, without strategic vision, an organizational "fix" may prove
to be ineffective.

The American people, its leaders, and the

pluralist system do not seem well-suited to seeking long-term
goals.

A centralized system such as that of the Soviet Union

probably finds the task far less foreboding.

Moreover, our own

preconceptions make it difficult to accept that other nations may
have strategic aims, long-term plans, or visions of the future.
To affect these built-in limitations, only effective American
leadership can clearly convey the national security ramifications
of LIC to the American public and stimulate the development
of a·successful approach.
In the 1960's, the Army's Special Forces probably appealed
to another American peculiarity, a problem-solving mentality
which drives a cultural perception that our national resources
(human and technical) can reduce any problem to its essentials
and solve it.1 6

LIC may prove to be insoluble, so we should not

look on SOF as a panacea for or solution to LIC challenges.
American culture also seems to yearn for distinct endings, a
tendency especially evident when its military forces are committed
to conflicts.

A "win v. lose· notion eschewing any middle ground

15

See the several publications of Sarkesian, all op. cit ••

16

Cohen, op. cit., PP• 86-87.
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will frustrate American approaches to LIC, which may not have a
distinct ending or allow the emergence of clear winners or losers.
The deterrence concept, usually discussed in the strategic warfare
context, may be difficult to apply to LIC because cost-benefit
ratios cannot be weighed easily at the lower end of the conflict
spectrum.

Yet, sophisticated skills for LIC could preclude the

breakout of higher-intensity conflicts, so "deterrence" need not
disappear from the lexicon at low conflict levels.

LIC could be

described as a problem of "conflict management," as international
relationists have put it, in which we strive to keep conflict
problems at or below a simmering point.
SOF have been at the forefront of U.S. efforts to cope with
newly perceived threats, an unsurprising situation given their
adaptability.
expa~sions

Yet, no employaent strategy has accompanied SOF

toward those threats.

It is possible that the SOF

adaptability trait has reduced the likelihood of the development
of an employment strategy since SOF seem to fill preparedness
gaps somewhat amorphously.

The underlying reason for a lack of

strategy is probably that despite a SOF "feel" for the political
and psychological aspects of LIC,'these forces cannot develop a
strategy on their own.

The U.S. Department of State, the Central

Intelligence Agency, and all relevant government agencies must be
brought to bear on this problem with some form of coordinated
effort.
As with the British SAS, American SOF go through a continuous
process of justifying their existence, because they seem to need
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a raison d'etre. As suggested earlier, this process might be tied
to the cyclical developments of SOF and perhaps to periodically
aggressive U.S. foreign policies.

Both the current and 1960's

periods have been marked by an overwhelmingly singular focus -at the expense of viewing the totality of the problem.

For SF in

the 1960's, revolution and counter-insurgency ·were the watchwords;
in the 1980's, terrorism has impelled the development of Delta
Force, a counter-terror SEAL team, and a joint command for strike
assets.
This myopic approach seems to appeal to the American public,
which apparently needs to perceive a concrete threat (i.e., the
terrorists are out to get us).

Even during Vietnam, government

reports emphasized the terror aspect of VC operations, often
ignoring their political and civic action efforts as though the
NLF

~ould

have had no appeal without the effective use of terrorism.

If we maintain this limited perspective, we will continue to
have serious problems with future conflicts,

especially when we

attempt to support counter-revolutionary systems fighting communist
cadres.
The argument of this paper is not that a conventionally and
strategically oriented DoD is incapable of successfully integrating
its assets for LIC.

Nor does it contend that the skills required

for LIC cannot be found among or developed by conventional soldiers.
But the American military reflects the mainstream of the society
that spawns it, so cultural notions support traditional conventional
military outlooks and discourage an understanding of unclear
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threats.
SOF defy the unknown and risk the unattempted, and they have
found themselves on the cutting edge of approaches to new challenges.
LIC is that new challenge.
demands sophistication.
ively.

It is complex; it is difficult; it

Sun Tzu would have understood it instinct-

Some analysts feel that LIC is an abominable term, more likely

to confuse than to clarify.

But the phrase at least gives us a

starting point and some frame of reference, a simple one which
the American public might grasp.

Special Operations Forces are

a foundation upon which to build many of the skills needed to
cope with low-intensity conflict, and they already represent our
best military assets for dealing with this present and future
danger.
Soviet LIC strategy is ominous.

The U.S. would do well to

heed. Sun Tzu's counsel that "what is of supreme importance in war
is to attack the enemy's strategy.•

In the final analysis,

however, our fate lies in our hands, not theirs.

Pericles, the

Athenian hero of Thucydide's Peloponnesian Wars, once addressed the
Spartan maritime strategy by saying that "it is not the enemy's
devices but our own blunders that we should fear most."
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